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Sebastian Pfeil

Personal Details

First Name:Sebastian
Middle Name:
Last Name:Pfeil
Suffix:
RePEc Short-ID:ppf16
[This author has chosen not to make the email address public]
http://www.sebastianpfeil.de
Terminal Degree:2011 (from RePEc Genealogy)

Affiliation

Faculteit Economie en Bedrijfskunde
Rijksuniversiteit Groningen

Groningen, Netherlands
http://www.rug.nl/feb/
RePEc:edi:ferugnl (more details at EDIRC)

Research output

as
Jump to: Working papers Articles

Working papers

  1. Inderst, Roman & Fecht, Falko & ,, 2022. "A Theory of the Boundaries of Banks with Implications for Financial Integration and Regulation," CEPR Discussion Papers 16880, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  2. Gianni De Nicolò & Nataliya Klimenko & Sebastian Pfeil & Jean-Charles Rochet, 2021. "The Long-Term Effects of Capital Requirements," CESifo Working Paper Series 9115, CESifo.
  3. Nataliya Klimenko & Sebastian Pfeil & Jean-Charles Rochet & Gianni De Nicolo, 2016. "Aggregate Bank Capital and Credit Dynamics," Swiss Finance Institute Research Paper Series 16-42, Swiss Finance Institute.
  4. Inderst, Roman & Pfeil, Sebastian, 2014. "An "Image Theory" of RPM," MPRA Paper 54139, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  5. Inderst, Roman & Pfeil, Sebastian, 2010. "Securitization and Compensation in Financial Institutions," CEPR Discussion Papers 8089, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.

Articles

  1. Hoffmann, Florian & Pfeil, Sebastian, 2021. "Dynamic multitasking and managerial investment incentives," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 142(2), pages 954-974.
  2. Klimenko, Nataliya & Pfeil, Sebastian & Rochet, Jean-Charles, 2017. "A simple macroeconomic model with extreme financial frictions," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 68(C), pages 92-102.
  3. Roman Inderst & Sebastian Pfeil, 2013. "Securitization and Compensation in Financial Institutions," Review of Finance, European Finance Association, vol. 17(4), pages 1323-1364.
  4. Florian Hoffmann & Sebastian Pfeil, 2010. "Reward for Luck in a Dynamic Agency Model," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 23(9), pages 3329-3345.

Citations

Many of the citations below have been collected in an experimental project, CitEc, where a more detailed citation analysis can be found. These are citations from works listed in RePEc that could be analyzed mechanically. So far, only a minority of all works could be analyzed. See under "Corrections" how you can help improve the citation analysis.

Blog mentions

As found by EconAcademics.org, the blog aggregator for Economics research:
  1. Gianni De Nicolo & Nataliya Klimenko & Sebastian Pfeil & Jean-Charles Rochet, 2021. "The Long-Term Effects of Capital Requirements," Swiss Finance Institute Research Paper Series 21-52, Swiss Finance Institute.

    Mentioned in:

    1. The Long-Term Effects of Capital Requirements
      by Christian Zimmermann in NEP-DGE blog on 2021-09-06 21:21:09

Working papers

  1. Inderst, Roman & Fecht, Falko & ,, 2022. "A Theory of the Boundaries of Banks with Implications for Financial Integration and Regulation," CEPR Discussion Papers 16880, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.

    Cited by:

    1. Taylor, John B. & Wieland, Volker, 2016. "Finding the equilibrium real interest rate in a fog of policy deviations," IMFS Working Paper Series 103, Goethe University Frankfurt, Institute for Monetary and Financial Stability (IMFS).
    2. Ding, Haina & Guembel, Alexander & Ozanne, Alessio, 2020. "Market Information in Banking Supervision: The Role of Stress Test Design," TSE Working Papers 20-1144, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).

  2. Gianni De Nicolò & Nataliya Klimenko & Sebastian Pfeil & Jean-Charles Rochet, 2021. "The Long-Term Effects of Capital Requirements," CESifo Working Paper Series 9115, CESifo.

    Cited by:

    1. Cappelletti, Giuseppe & Reghezza, Alessio & Rodríguez d'Acri, Costanza & Spaggiari, Martina, 2022. "Compositional effects of bank capital buffers and interactions with monetary policy," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 140(C).
    2. Andreas Haufler & Christoph Lülfesmann, 2022. "Voluntary Equity, Project Risk, and Capital Requirements," CESifo Working Paper Series 9505, CESifo.
    3. Gulan, Adam & Jokivuolle, Esa & Verona, Fabio, 2022. "Optimal bank capital requirements: What do the macroeconomic models say?," BoF Economics Review 2/2022, Bank of Finland.
    4. Hoffmann, Florian & Pfeil, Sebastian, 2021. "Dynamic multitasking and managerial investment incentives," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 142(2), pages 954-974.

  3. Nataliya Klimenko & Sebastian Pfeil & Jean-Charles Rochet & Gianni De Nicolo, 2016. "Aggregate Bank Capital and Credit Dynamics," Swiss Finance Institute Research Paper Series 16-42, Swiss Finance Institute.

    Cited by:

    1. Vadim Elenev & Tim Landvoigt & Stijn Van Nieuwerburgh, 2018. "A Macroeconomic Model with Financially Constrained Producers and Intermediaries," NBER Working Papers 24757, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Chabakauri, Georgy & Han, Brandon Yueyang, 2020. "Collateral constraints and asset prices," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 138(3), pages 754-776.
    3. Calisse, Frank, 2019. "The impact of long-range dependence in the capital stock on interest rate and wealth distribution," VfS Annual Conference 2019 (Leipzig): 30 Years after the Fall of the Berlin Wall - Democracy and Market Economy 203591, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    4. Ye Li & Simon Mayer & Simon Mayer, 2021. "Money Creation in Decentralized Finance: A Dynamic Model of Stablecoin and Crypto Shadow Banking," CESifo Working Paper Series 9260, CESifo.
    5. Enoch Hill & David Perez-Reyna, 2016. "Macroprudential Regulation and Misallocation," Documentos CEDE 14974, Universidad de los Andes, Facultad de Economía, CEDE.
    6. Modena, Andrea, 2020. "Recapitalization, bailout, and long-run welfare in a dynamic model of banking," SAFE Working Paper Series 292, Leibniz Institute for Financial Research SAFE.
    7. Tong Zhang, 2019. "Haircut Cycles," 2019 Meeting Papers 124, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    8. Kai Ding & Enoch Hill & David Perez-Reyna, 2021. "Optimal capital requirements with noisy signals on banking risk," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 71(4), pages 1649-1687, June.
    9. Borovicka, J. & Hansen, L.P., 2016. "Term Structure of Uncertainty in the Macroeconomy," Handbook of Macroeconomics, in: J. B. Taylor & Harald Uhlig (ed.), Handbook of Macroeconomics, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 0, pages 1641-1696, Elsevier.
    10. Celso Brunetti & Agostino Capponi & Christoph Frei, 2017. "Managing Counterparty Risk in OTC Markets," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2017-083, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    11. Andrea Modena, 2020. "Recapitalization, Bailout, and Long-run Welfare in a Dynamic Model of Banking," Working Papers 2020:23, Department of Economics, University of Venice "Ca' Foscari".
    12. Benigno, Pierpaolo & Robatto, Roberto, 2019. "Inefficiency and Regulation of Private Liquidity," CEPR Discussion Papers 13631, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    13. Christoph Bertsch & Mike Mariathasan, 2021. "Optimal bank leverage and recapitalization in crowded markets," BIS Working Papers 923, Bank for International Settlements.
    14. Tchakoute Tchuigoua, Hubert & Soumaré, Issouf & Hessou, Hélyoth T.S., 2020. "Lending and business cycle: Evidence from microfinance institutions," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 119(C), pages 1-12.
    15. Tetiana Davydiuk, 2017. "Dynamic Bank Capital Requirements," 2017 Meeting Papers 1328, Society for Economic Dynamics.

  4. Inderst, Roman & Pfeil, Sebastian, 2014. "An "Image Theory" of RPM," MPRA Paper 54139, University Library of Munich, Germany.

    Cited by:

    1. David E. Mills, 2017. "Inducing Cooperation with a Carrot Instead of a Stick," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 50(2), pages 245-261, March.

  5. Inderst, Roman & Pfeil, Sebastian, 2010. "Securitization and Compensation in Financial Institutions," CEPR Discussion Papers 8089, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.

    Cited by:

    1. Pagès, Henri, 2013. "Bank monitoring incentives and optimal ABS," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 22(1), pages 30-54.
    2. Colonnello, Stefano & Curatola, Giuliano & Ngoc Giang Hoang, 2016. "Direct and indirect risk-taking incentives of inside debt," SAFE Working Paper Series 60, Leibniz Institute for Financial Research SAFE, revised 2016.
    3. Larry D. Wall, 2019. "Is Stricter Regulation of Incentive Compensation the Missing Piece?," FRB Atlanta Working Paper 2019-6, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta.
    4. Zhang, Xiong, 2020. "Convertible tranche in securitization," The North American Journal of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 52(C).
    5. Pagès, H., 2009. "Bank incentives and optimal CDOs," Working papers 253, Banque de France.
    6. Feess, Eberhard & Wohlschlegel, Ansgar, 2014. "Bank Capital Requirements and Mandatory Deferral of Compensation," MPRA Paper 59456, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    7. Cambrea, Domenico Rocco & Colonnello, Stefano & Curatola, Giuliano & Fantini, Giulia, 2019. "CEO investment of deferred compensation plans and firm performance," SAFE Working Paper Series 160, Leibniz Institute for Financial Research SAFE, revised 2019.
    8. Riachi, Ilham & Schwienbacher, Armin, 2013. "Securitization of corporate assets and executive compensation," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 21(C), pages 235-251.
    9. Jeong-Bon Kim & Li Li & Mary L. Z. Ma & Frank M. Song, 2013. "CEO Option Compensation, Risk-Taking Incentives, and Systemic Risk in the Banking Industry," Working Papers 182013, Hong Kong Institute for Monetary Research.
    10. Inderst, Roman & Hoffmann, Florian & Opp, Marcus, 2014. "Regulating Deferred Incentive Pay," CEPR Discussion Papers 9877, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    11. Thomas Bauer & Thomas Kourouxous & Peter Krenn, 2018. "Taxation and agency conflicts between firm owners and managers: a review," Business Research, Springer;German Academic Association for Business Research, vol. 11(1), pages 33-76, February.
    12. John Thanassoulis, 2013. "Industry Structure, Executive Pay, and Short-Termism," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 59(2), pages 402-419, June.
    13. Pruijssers, Jorien Louise & Singer, Gallia & Singer, Zvi & Tsang, Desmond, 2023. "Social influence pressures and the risk preferences of aspiring financial market professionals," Journal of Accounting Education, Elsevier, vol. 62(C).

Articles

  1. Hoffmann, Florian & Pfeil, Sebastian, 2021. "Dynamic multitasking and managerial investment incentives," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 142(2), pages 954-974.

    Cited by:

    1. Tak-Yuen Wong, 2019. "Dynamic Agency and Endogenous Risk-Taking," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 65(9), pages 4032-4048, September.
    2. Gryglewicz, Sebastian & Mayer, Simon & Morellec, Erwan, 2021. "Optimal financing with tokens," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 142(3), pages 1038-1067.

  2. Klimenko, Nataliya & Pfeil, Sebastian & Rochet, Jean-Charles, 2017. "A simple macroeconomic model with extreme financial frictions," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 68(C), pages 92-102.

    Cited by:

    1. Pietro Dindo & Andrea Modena & Loriana Pelizzon, 2019. "Risk Pooling, Leverage, and the Business Cycle," Working Papers 2019: 21, Department of Economics, University of Venice "Ca' Foscari".
    2. Raouf Boucekkine & Kazuo Nishimura & Alain Venditti, 2016. "Introduction to International Financial Markets and Banking Systems Crises," AMSE Working Papers 1824, Aix-Marseille School of Economics, France.
    3. Gianni De Nicolò & Nataliya Klimenko & Sebastian Pfeil & Jean-Charles Rochet, 2021. "The Long-Term Effects of Capital Requirements," CESifo Working Paper Series 9115, CESifo.
    4. Andrianos E. Tsekrekos, 2019. "Moreno-Bromberg, Santiago and Rochet, Jean-Charles: Continuous-Time Models in Corporate Finance, Banking and Insurance," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 126(3), pages 287-290, April.
    5. Paymon Khorrami & Fernando Mendo, 2021. "Rational Sentiments and Financial Frictions," Working Papers Central Bank of Chile 928, Central Bank of Chile.
    6. Keisuke Kizaki & Taiga Saito & Akihiko Takahashi, 2023. "A multi-agent incomplete equilibrium model and its applications to reinsurance pricing and life-cycle investment (Forthcoming in "Insurance: Mathematics and Economics")," CARF F-Series CARF-F-576, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.

  3. Roman Inderst & Sebastian Pfeil, 2013. "Securitization and Compensation in Financial Institutions," Review of Finance, European Finance Association, vol. 17(4), pages 1323-1364.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  4. Florian Hoffmann & Sebastian Pfeil, 2010. "Reward for Luck in a Dynamic Agency Model," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 23(9), pages 3329-3345.

    Cited by:

    1. Pagès, Henri, 2013. "Bank monitoring incentives and optimal ABS," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 22(1), pages 30-54.
    2. Pierre Chaigneau & Nicolas Sahuguet, "undated". "The structure of CEO pay: pay-for-luck and stock-options," FMG Discussion Papers dp713, Financial Markets Group.
    3. Moreno-Bromberg, Santiago & Vo, Quynh-Anh, 2017. "Resolution of financial distress under agency frictions," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 82(C), pages 40-58.
    4. Wang, Ying & Huang, Wenli & Liu, Bo & Zhang, Xiaohong, 2020. "Optimal effort in the principal-agent problem with time-inconsistent preferences," The North American Journal of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 52(C).
    5. Bell, Brian & Pedemonte, Simone & Van Reenen, John, 2021. "CEO pay and the rise of relative performance contracts: a question of governance?," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 112749, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    6. Lucas W. Davis and Catherine Hausman, 2020. "Are Energy Executives Rewarded for Luck?," The Energy Journal, International Association for Energy Economics, vol. 0(Number 6), pages 157-180.
    7. Qi Liu & Bo Sun, 2016. "Relative Wealth Concerns, Executive Compensation, and Systemic Risk-Taking," International Finance Discussion Papers 1164, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    8. Brett Green & Curtis R. Taylor, 2016. "Breakthroughs, Deadlines, and Self-Reported Progress: Contracting for Multistage Projects," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 106(12), pages 3660-3699, December.
    9. Chaigneau, Pierre & Edmans, Alex & Gottlieb, Daniel, 2018. "Does improved information improve incentives?," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 130(2), pages 291-307.
    10. Martin, Jessica & Villeneuve, Stéphane, 2021. "A Class of Explicit optimal contracts in the face of shutdown," TSE Working Papers 21-1183, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), revised Apr 2022.
    11. Ronald Anderson & Cecilia Bustamante & Stéphane Guibaud & Mihail Zervos, 2018. "Agency, Firm Growth, and Managerial Turnover," Post-Print hal-03391936, HAL.
    12. Liu, Bo & Mu, Congming & Yang, Jinqiang, 2017. "Dynamic agency and investment theory with time-inconsistent preferences," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, vol. 20(C), pages 88-95.
    13. Keiichi Hori & Hiroshi Osano, 2013. "Managerial Incentives and the Role of Advisors in the Continuous-Time Agency Model," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 26(10), pages 2620-2647.
    14. Hoffmann, Florian & Pfeil, Sebastian, 2021. "Dynamic multitasking and managerial investment incentives," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 142(2), pages 954-974.
    15. Tak-Yuen Wong, 2019. "Dynamic Agency and Endogenous Risk-Taking," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 65(9), pages 4032-4048, September.
    16. Jonathan Wiley & Brandon Cline & Xudong Fu & Tian Tang, 2012. "Valuation Effects for Asset Sales," Journal of Financial Services Research, Springer;Western Finance Association, vol. 41(3), pages 103-120, June.
    17. Ronald Anderson & Cecilia Bustamante & Stéphane Guibaud & Mihail Zervos, 2018. "Agency, Firm Growth, and Managerial Turnover," Sciences Po publications info:hdl:2441/2iclr3ojhv9, Sciences Po.
    18. Dumav, Martin & Fuchs, William & Lee, Jangwoo, 2022. "Self-enforcing contracts with persistence," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 128(C), pages 72-87.
    19. Pagès, H., 2009. "Bank incentives and optimal CDOs," Working papers 253, Banque de France.
    20. Jessica Martin & St'ephane Villeneuve, 2021. "A Class of Explicit optimal contracts in the face of shutdown," Papers 2102.00001, arXiv.org.
    21. Xi Chen & Yu Chen & Xuhu Wan, 2018. "Delegated Project Search," Graz Economics Papers 2018-11, University of Graz, Department of Economics.
    22. li, Hong & Mu, Congming & Yang, Jinqiang, 2016. "Optimal contract theory with time-inconsistent preferences," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 52(PB), pages 519-530.
    23. Hiroshi Osano & Keiichi Hori, 2015. "A Dynamic Agency Theory of Investment and Managerial Replacement," KIER Working Papers 921, Kyoto University, Institute of Economic Research.
    24. Katolnik, Svetlana & Schöndube, Jens Robert, 2015. "Don't Kill the Goose that Lays the Golden Eggs: Strategic Delay in Project Completion," VfS Annual Conference 2015 (Muenster): Economic Development - Theory and Policy 113046, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    25. Ronald Anderson & Cecilia Bustamante & Stéphane Guibaud & Mihail Zervos, 2018. "Agency, Firm Growth, and Managerial Turnover," SciencePo Working papers Main hal-03391936, HAL.
    26. Katolnik, Svetlana & Schöndube, Jens Robert, 2014. "Don't Kill the Goose that Lays the Golden Eggs: Strategic Delay in Project Completion," Hannover Economic Papers (HEP) dp-533, Leibniz Universität Hannover, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät.
    27. Mayer, Simon, 2022. "Financing breakthroughs under failure risk," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 144(3), pages 807-848.
    28. Li, Rui, 2017. "Dynamic agency with persistent observable shocks," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 71(C), pages 74-91.
    29. Anderson, Ronald W. & Bustamante, Maria Cecilia & Guibaud, Stéphane & Zervos, Mihail, 2018. "Agency, firm growth, and managerial turnover," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 68784, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    30. Borys Grochulski & Russell Wong & Yuzhe Zhang, 2017. "Optimal Incentive Contracts with Job Destruction Risk," Working Paper 17-11, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond.
    31. Yaoyao Wu & Jinqiang Yang & Zhentao Zou, 2018. "Ambiguity sharing and the lack of relative performance evaluation," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 66(1), pages 141-157, July.
    32. Hori, Keiichi & Osano, Hiroshi, 2020. "Dynamic contract and discretionary termination policy under loss aversion," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 111(C).
    33. Morellec, Erwan & Gryglewicz, Sebastian & Mayer, Simon, 2018. "Agency Conflicts over the Short and Long Run: Short-termism, Long-termism, and Pay-for-Luck," CEPR Discussion Papers 12720, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    34. de Oliveira, Angela C.M. & Smith, Alexander & Spraggon, John, 2017. "Reward the lucky? An experimental investigation of the impact of agency and luck on bonuses," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 62(C), pages 87-97.
    35. Gryglewicz, Sebastian & Mayer, Simon & Morellec, Erwan, 2020. "Agency conflicts and short- versus long-termism in corporate policies," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 136(3), pages 718-742.
    36. Jessica Martin & Stéphane Villeneuve, 2021. "A Class of Explicit optimal contracts in the face of shutdown," Working Papers hal-03124102, HAL.
    37. Felix Feng, 2018. "Dynamic Compensation under Uncertainty Shocks and Limited Commitment," 2018 Meeting Papers 159, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    38. Yu Huang & Nengjiu Ju & Hao Xing, 2023. "Performance Evaluation, Managerial Hedging, and Contract Termination," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 69(8), pages 4953-4971, August.
    39. Hengjie Ai & Rui Li, 2012. "Moral hazard, investment, and firm dynamics," FRB Atlanta CQER Working Paper 2012-01, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta.
    40. Dylan Possamai & Nizar Touzi, 2020. "Is there a Golden Parachute in Sannikov's principal-agent problem?," Papers 2007.05529, arXiv.org, revised Oct 2022.

More information

Research fields, statistics, top rankings, if available.

Statistics

Access and download statistics for all items

Co-authorship network on CollEc

NEP Fields

NEP is an announcement service for new working papers, with a weekly report in each of many fields. This author has had 5 papers announced in NEP. These are the fields, ordered by number of announcements, along with their dates. If the author is listed in the directory of specialists for this field, a link is also provided.
  1. NEP-BAN: Banking (4) 2015-05-02 2016-07-30 2021-06-21 2021-08-16
  2. NEP-CBA: Central Banking (3) 2015-05-02 2021-06-21 2021-08-16
  3. NEP-MAC: Macroeconomics (3) 2016-07-30 2021-06-21 2021-08-16
  4. NEP-DGE: Dynamic General Equilibrium (2) 2016-07-30 2021-08-16
  5. NEP-FDG: Financial Development and Growth (2) 2021-06-21 2021-08-16
  6. NEP-RMG: Risk Management (2) 2021-06-21 2021-08-16
  7. NEP-COM: Industrial Competition (1) 2014-03-15
  8. NEP-CTA: Contract Theory and Applications (1) 2014-03-15
  9. NEP-ISF: Islamic Finance (1) 2021-08-16
  10. NEP-MKT: Marketing (1) 2014-03-15

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