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Corrupt tax bureau commissioners and corporate tax avoidance

Author

Listed:
  • Jian Chu

    (Nanjing University)

  • Yaowen Shan

    (University of Technology Sydney)

  • Gary Gang Tian

    (Macquarie University)

Abstract

This study documents that Chinese non-state-owned enterprises have effective tax rates that are 1% lower during the tenure of corrupt regional tax bureau commissioners (i.e., regional tax bureau chiefs). The reduction in the effective tax rate persists even after controlling for political connections of firms, general local corruption, and a variety of other determinants of tax avoidance. Further analysis shows that corrupt tax commissioners induce bribery activities and exacerbate tax avoidance, and firms in a region overseen by a corrupt tax commissioner are more likely to engage in tax haven operations and tax evasion activities as tax aggressive strategies. However, the influence of corrupt tax commissioners is moderated by a stronger regional legal system and a better information environment. Overall, our results highlight the significant impact of individual tax administrators on corporate tax avoidance behavior.

Suggested Citation

  • Jian Chu & Yaowen Shan & Gary Gang Tian, 2025. "Corrupt tax bureau commissioners and corporate tax avoidance," Review of Accounting Studies, Springer, vol. 30(2), pages 1873-1915, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:reaccs:v:30:y:2025:i:2:d:10.1007_s11142-024-09862-4
    DOI: 10.1007/s11142-024-09862-4
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Tax avoidance; Tax commissioners; Corruption; Corporate bribery;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H26 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Tax Evasion and Avoidance
    • M48 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Accounting - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption

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