Analyst Coverage and Financing Decisions
We provide evidence that analyst coverage affects the pattern of security issuance. First, firms covered by fewer analysts are less likely to issue equity as opposed to debt. They issue equity less frequently, but when they do so, it is in larger amounts. Moreover, these firms depend more on favorable market conditions for their equity issuance decisions. Although all firms issue larger amounts of equity after favorable stock returns, this tendency is more pronounced for less covered firms. Finally, debt ratios of firms followed by fewer analysts are more affected by Baker and Wurgler's (2002) external finance-weighted average market-to-book ratio than those of firms followed by more analysts. These results are consistent with market timing behavior in the presence of information asymmetry, as well as behavior implied by dynamic adverse selection models of equity issuance.
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|Date of creation:||01 Dec 2006|
|Publication status:||Published in Journal of Finance, Wiley, 2006, Vol.61, n°6, pp.3009-3048. <10.1111/j.1540-6261.2006.01010.x>|
|Note:||View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal-hec.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00481946|
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/|
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