Key issues in the design of pay for performance programs
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More about this item
KeywordsCompensation methods; Incentive reimbursement; Pay for performance; Program design; Provider behavior; D03; D86; I11; J31; J33;
- D03 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Behavioral Microeconomics: Underlying Principles
- D86 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Economics of Contract Law
- I11 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Analysis of Health Care Markets
- J31 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials
- J33 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Compensation Packages; Payment Methods
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