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Effects of pay for performance in health care: A systematic review of systematic reviews

Listed author(s):
  • Eijkenaar, Frank
  • Emmert, Martin
  • Scheppach, Manfred
  • Schöffski, Oliver
Registered author(s):

    A vast amount of literature on effects of pay-for-performance (P4P) in health care has been published. However, the evidence has become fragmented and it has become challenging to grasp the information included in it.

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    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0168851013000183
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    Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Health Policy.

    Volume (Year): 110 (2013)
    Issue (Month): 2 ()
    Pages: 115-130

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    Handle: RePEc:eee:hepoli:v:110:y:2013:i:2:p:115-130
    DOI: 10.1016/j.healthpol.2013.01.008
    Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/healthpol

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    1. Hugh Gravelle & Matt Sutton & Ada Ma, 2010. "Doctor Behaviour under a Pay for Performance Contract: Treating, Cheating and Case Finding?," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 120(542), pages 129-156, 02.
    2. David Dranove & Daniel Kessler & Mark McClellan & Mark Satterthwaite, 2003. "Is More Information Better? The Effects of "Report Cards" on Health Care Providers," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 111(3), pages 555-588, June.
    3. Frolich, Anne & Talavera, Jason A. & Broadhead, Peter & Dudley, R. Adams, 2007. "A behavioral model of clinician responses to incentives to improve quality," Health Policy, Elsevier, vol. 80(1), pages 179-193, January.
    4. Holmstrom, Bengt & Milgrom, Paul, 1991. "Multitask Principal-Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 7(0), pages 24-52, Special I.
    5. Martin Emmert & Frank Eijkenaar & Heike Kemter & Adelheid Esslinger & Oliver Schöffski, 2012. "Economic evaluation of pay-for-performance in health care: a systematic review," The European Journal of Health Economics, Springer;Deutsche Gesellschaft für Gesundheitsökonomie (DGGÖ), vol. 13(6), pages 755-767, December.
    6. Frank Eijkenaar, 2013. "Key issues in the design of pay for performance programs," The European Journal of Health Economics, Springer;Deutsche Gesellschaft für Gesundheitsökonomie (DGGÖ), vol. 14(1), pages 117-131, February.
    7. Kathleen J. Mullen & Richard G. Frank & Meredith B. Rosenthal, 2010. "Can you get what you pay for? Pay-for-performance and the quality of healthcare providers," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 41(1), pages 64-91.
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