Money talks: Paying physicians for performance
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"Medical insurance and free choice of physician shape patient overtreatment: A laboratory experiment,"
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More about this item
Keywordsexperimental economics; physician remuneration; pay-for-performance (P4P);
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2015-01-03 (All new papers)
- NEP-ALL-2015-01-08 (All new papers)
- NEP-EXP-2015-01-03 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-HEA-2015-01-03 (Health Economics)
- NEP-HRM-2015-01-03 (Human Capital & Human Resource Management)
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