Moral hazard and Risk Speading in Partnerships
Partnerships provide a classic of tradoff between risk spreading and moral hazard. The degree to which firms choose to spread risk and sacrifice efficiency incentive s depends upon risk preferences, for which data are typically unavailable. We use a unique dataset on medical group practice to investigate this tradoff.
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|Date of creation:||1996|
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