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Workers#x0027; Compensation Recipiency in Union and Nonunion Workplaces

Author

Listed:
  • Barry T. Hirsch
  • David A. MacPherson
  • J. Michael Dumond

Abstract

This study estimates union effects on workers' compensation indemnity claims in 1977–92, based on individual panel data constructed from the March Current Population Survey. Union members were substantially more likely to receive workers' compensation benefits than were similar nonunion workers, and they were more sensitive to variation in benefit levels and waiting periods. The authors suggest that differences in union, as compared to nonunion, workplaces arise because workers are provided with information from their union representatives, supervisors are more likely to inform injured workers about workers' compensation filing procedures and less likely to discourage workers from filing claims, workers are less likely to fear being penalized for filing claims, and management has less discretion and ability to monitor workers and penalize them for questionable claims. The findings suggest that communication of relevant information to workers is an important determinant of workers' compensation recipiency.

Suggested Citation

  • Barry T. Hirsch & David A. MacPherson & J. Michael Dumond, 1997. "Workers#x0027; Compensation Recipiency in Union and Nonunion Workplaces," ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 50(2), pages 213-236, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:ilrrev:v:50:y:1997:i:2:p:213-236
    DOI: 10.1177/001979399705000202
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    References listed on IDEAS

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