IDEAS home Printed from
MyIDEAS: Log in (now much improved!) to save this paper

Duration of Non-Work Spells in the Workers' Compensation Insurance System: Unionized vs. Non-Unionized Workers

Listed author(s):
  • Avner Ben-Ner


  • Yong-Seung Park


This paper analyzes the effect of unions on the duration of non- work spells of claimants in the workers' compensation insurance system. It has been argued that a union may affect the duration of non-work spells in two ways. First, a union may alter the true level of workplace safety and, in turn, affect both the frequency and severity of work-related injuries ('true safety' effect). Second, a union may influence workers' incentives to file claims or stay in the system for the longer non-work spell ('claims-reporting moral hazard' effect). This study analyzes 9,818 workers' compensation claims filed with the Minnesota Department of Labor and Industry for injuries that occurred in 1993 and 1994 in 873 sample firms included in the Minnesota Human Resource Management Practice (MHRMP) Survey. To correct for the right-censoring data problem, we use a maximum likelihood estimate of duration of nonwork spells using the Weibull distribution. Empirical results show that being a union member is associated with a 19% increase in the duration of non-work spells. This means that, on average, the non-work spells are approximately ten days longer for workers from unionized firms as compared to their non-unionized counterparts in the sample of this study.

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL:
Download Restriction: no

Paper provided by Human Resources and Labor Studies, University of Minnesota (Twin Cities Campus) in its series Working Papers with number 1202.

in new window

Date of creation:
Handle: RePEc:hrr:papers:1202
Contact details of provider: Postal:
3-300 Carlson School of Management, 321 19th Avenue South, Minneapolis, MN 55455-0438

Phone: (612) 624-2500
Fax: (612) 624-8360
Web page:

More information through EDIRC

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

in new window

  1. David Card & Brian P. McCall, 1996. "Is Workers' Compensation Covering Uninsured Medical Costs? Evidence from the “Monday Effectâ€," ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 49(4), pages 690-706, July.
  2. Duncan, Greg J & Stafford, Frank P, 1980. "Do Union Members Receive Compensating Wage Differentials?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 70(3), pages 355-371, June.
  3. Craig A. Olson, 1981. "An Analysis of Wage Differentials Received by Workers on Dangerous Jobs," Journal of Human Resources, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 16(2), pages 167-185.
  4. Barry T. Hirsch & David A. MacPherson & J. Michael Dumond, 1997. "Workers#x0027; Compensation Recipiency in Union and Nonunion Workplaces," ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 50(2), pages 213-236, January.
  5. Krueger, Alan B., 1990. "Incentive effects of workers' compensation insurance," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(1), pages 73-99, February.
  6. Yong-Seung Park & Richard J. Butler, 2001. "The Safety Costs of Contingent Work: Evidence from Minnesota ," Journal of Labor Research, Transaction Publishers, vol. 22(4), pages 832-849, October.
  7. W. Kip Viscusi, 1979. "The Impact of Occupational Safety and Health Regulation," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 10(1), pages 117-140, Spring.
  8. Fairris, D., 1989. "Compensating Payments And Hazardous Work In Union And Nonunion Settings," Department of Economics Working Papers 134, Department of Economics, Williams College.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hrr:papers:1202. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Mary Helen Walker)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.