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Promoting Safety through Workers' Compensation: The Efficacy and Net Wage Costs of Injury Insurance

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  • Michael J. Moore
  • W. Kip Viscusi

Abstract

This article explores the effects of workers' compensation on fatality rates and wages using the 1982 Panel Study of Income Dynamics and the new occupational fatality data issued by the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health. The fatality rate depends upon the workers' compensation benefit variables in a manner that suggest that the safety incentive effects of higher insurance premiums offset any moral hazard effect. The estimates imply that in the absence of workers' compensation, fatality rates would increase by over 20%. Premium levels substantially overstate the cost of workers' compensation, due primarily to a direct wage offset from higher benefits. An indirect wage offset resulting from the decrease in risk caused by workers' compensation augments the direct wage effects. The indirect offset is relatively small, equalling about 10% of the total.

Suggested Citation

  • Michael J. Moore & W. Kip Viscusi, 1989. "Promoting Safety through Workers' Compensation: The Efficacy and Net Wage Costs of Injury Insurance," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 20(4), pages 499-515, Winter.
    • Handle: RePEc:rje:randje:v:20:y:1989:i:winter:p:499-515
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    Cited by:

    1. Erin Todd Bronchetti & Melissa McInerney, 2012. "Revisiting Incentive Effects in Workers' Compensation: Do Higher Benefits Really Induce More Claims?," ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 65(2), pages 286-315, April.
    2. Agamoni Majumder & S. Madheswaran, 2020. "Compensation for Occupational Risk and Valuation of Statistical Life," Social Indicators Research: An International and Interdisciplinary Journal for Quality-of-Life Measurement, Springer, vol. 149(3), pages 967-989, June.
    3. W. Kip Viscusi, 1991. "Product and Occupational Liability," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 5(3), pages 71-91, Summer.
    4. Alison Morantz, 2010. "Opting Out of Workers' Compensation in Texas: A Survey of Large, Multistate Nonsubscribers," NBER Chapters, in: Regulation vs. Litigation: Perspectives from Economics and Law, pages 197-238, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    5. Terry Thomason & Silvana Pozzebon, 2002. "Determinants of Firm Workplace Health and Safety and Claims Management Practices," ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 55(2), pages 286-307, January.
    6. Barry T. Hirsch & David A. MacPherson & J. Michael Dumond, 1997. "Workers#x0027; Compensation Recipiency in Union and Nonunion Workplaces," ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 50(2), pages 213-236, January.
    7. Kelly D. Edmiston, 2006. "Workers’ Compensation and State Employment Growth," Journal of Regional Science, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 46(1), pages 121-145, February.
    8. Georges Dionne & Paul Lanoie, 2002. "How to Make a Public Choice About the Value of a Statistical Life: The Case of Road Safety," Cahiers de recherche 02-04, HEC Montréal, Institut d'économie appliquée.
    9. Pascale Lengagne, 2016. "Experience Rating and Work-Related Health and Safety," Journal of Labor Research, Springer, vol. 37(1), pages 69-97, March.
    10. Vikström, Johan, 2009. "The effect of employer incentives in social insurance on individual wages," Working Paper Series 2009:13, IFAU - Institute for Evaluation of Labour Market and Education Policy.
    11. Robert Kaestner & Kosali Ilayperuma Simon, 2002. "Labor Market Consequences of State Health Insurance Regulation," ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 56(1), pages 136-159, October.
    12. Andy Yuan & Price V. Fishback, 2020. "Rising Burdens of Proofs and The Grand Bargain of Workers’ Compensation Laws," NBER Working Papers 26980, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    13. Robert Kaestner, 1996. "The Effect of Government-Mandated Benefits on Youth Employment," ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 50(1), pages 122-142, October.
    14. Krueger, Alan B. & Meyer, Bruce D., 2002. "Labor supply effects of social insurance," Handbook of Public Economics, in: A. J. Auerbach & M. Feldstein (ed.), Handbook of Public Economics, edition 1, volume 4, chapter 33, pages 2327-2392, Elsevier.
    15. Butler, Richard J. & Hartwig, Robert P. & Gardner, Harold, 1997. "HMOs, moral hazard and cost shifting in workers' compensation," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 16(2), pages 191-206, April.
    16. W. Kip Viscusi & Robert J. Cramer, 2023. "How regulations undervalue occupational fatalities," Regulation & Governance, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 17(1), pages 250-271, January.
    17. Psacale Lengagne & Anissa Afrite, 2015. "Experience Rating, Incidence of Musculoskeletal Disorders and Related Absences.Results from a Natural Experiment," Working Papers DT69, IRDES institut for research and information in health economics, revised Jul 2015.
    18. Kaestner, Robert & Grossman, Michael, 1998. "The effect of drug use on workplace accidents," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 5(3), pages 267-294, September.
    19. John Leeth & John Ruser, 2006. "Safety segregation: The importance of gender, race, and ethnicity on workplace risk," The Journal of Economic Inequality, Springer;Society for the Study of Economic Inequality, vol. 4(2), pages 123-152, August.
    20. Amanda M. Grittner & Matthew S. Johnson, 2021. "When Labor Enforcement and Immigration Enforcement Collide: Deterring Worker Complaints Worsens Workplace Safety," Upjohn Working Papers 21-353, W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research.
    21. Cento Veljanovski, 2021. "The Impact of Employers' Liability on 19th‐Century U.K. Coalmining Fatalities," Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 18(3), pages 660-683, September.
    22. Askenazy, Philippe, 2004. "Santé et sécurité au travail. Quelques éclairages économiques et internationaux," CEPREMAP Working Papers (Docweb) 0501, CEPREMAP.

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