IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/upj/weupjo/21-353.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

When Labor Enforcement and Immigration Enforcement Collide: Deterring Worker Complaints Worsens Workplace Safety

Author

Listed:
  • Amanda M. Grittner

    (Abt Associates)

  • Matthew S. Johnson

    (Duke University)

Abstract

Regulatory agencies overseeing the labor market often rely on worker complaints to direct their enforcement. However, if workers face differential barriers to complain, this system could result in ineffective targeting and create disparities in working conditions. To investigate these implications, we examine how the onset of Secure Communities—a localized immigration enforcement program—affected occupational safety and health. Counties’ participation in Secure Communities substantially reduced complaints to government safety regulators, but increased injuries, at workplaces with Hispanic workers. We show that these effects are most consistent with employers reducing safety inputs in response to workers’ decreased willingness to complain.

Suggested Citation

  • Amanda M. Grittner & Matthew S. Johnson, 2021. "When Labor Enforcement and Immigration Enforcement Collide: Deterring Worker Complaints Worsens Workplace Safety," Upjohn Working Papers 21-353, W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research.
  • Handle: RePEc:upj:weupjo:21-353
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://research.upjohn.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1372&context=up_workingpapers
    Download Restriction: This material is copyrighted. Permission is required to reproduce any or all parts.
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Jeff Biddle & Karen Roberts, 2003. "Claiming Behavior in Workers' Compensation," Journal of Risk & Insurance, The American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 70(4), pages 759-780, December.
    2. Clemens, Jeffrey & Strain, Michael R., 2022. "Understanding “Wage Theft”: Evasion and avoidance responses to minimum wage increases," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 79(C).
    3. Gary S. Becker, 1974. "Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach," NBER Chapters, in: Essays in the Economics of Crime and Punishment, pages 1-54, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    4. Fredrik Andersson & Mónica García-Pérez & John Haltiwanger & Kristin McCue & Seth Sanders, 2014. "Workplace Concentration of Immigrants," Demography, Springer;Population Association of America (PAA), vol. 51(6), pages 2281-2306, December.
    5. Marcella Alsan & Crystal Yang, 2018. "Fear and the Safety Net: Evidence from Secure Communities," NBER Working Papers 24731, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    6. Ling Li & Perry Singleton, 2019. "The Effect of Workplace Inspections on Worker Safety," ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 72(3), pages 718-748, May.
    7. Barry T. Hirsch & David A. MacPherson & J. Michael Dumond, 1997. "Workers#x0027; Compensation Recipiency in Union and Nonunion Workplaces," ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 50(2), pages 213-236, January.
    8. Timothy J. Bartik, 1992. "The Effects of State and Local Taxes on Economic Development: A Review of Recent Research," Economic Development Quarterly, , vol. 6(1), pages 102-111, February.
    9. David Weil, 1996. "If OSHA Is So Bad, Why is Compliance So Good?," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 27(3), pages 618-640, Autumn.
    10. Dahl, Gordon B. & Knepper, Matthew, 2021. "Why Is Workplace Sexual Harassment Underreported? The Value of outside Options amid the Threat of Retaliation," IZA Discussion Papers 14740, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    11. Jarkko Harju & Simon Jäger & Benjamin Schoefer, 2021. "Voice at Work," NBER Working Papers 28522, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    12. Ashenfelter, Orley & Smith, Robert S, 1979. "Compliance with the Minimum Wage Law," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 87(2), pages 333-350, April.
    13. repec:eee:labchp:v:1:y:1986:i:c:p:641-692 is not listed on IDEAS
    14. Thomas J. Miles & Adam B. Cox, 2014. "Does Immigration Enforcement Reduce Crime? Evidence from Secure Communities," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 57(4), pages 937-973.
    15. John M. Abowd & Bryce E. Stephens & Lars Vilhuber & Fredrik Andersson & Kevin L. McKinney & Marc Roemer & Simon Woodcock, 2009. "The LEHD Infrastructure Files and the Creation of the Quarterly Workforce Indicators," NBER Chapters, in: Producer Dynamics: New Evidence from Micro Data, pages 149-230, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    16. Marianne Bertrand & Esther Duflo & Sendhil Mullainathan, 2004. "How Much Should We Trust Differences-In-Differences Estimates?," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 119(1), pages 249-275.
    17. Thomas Dee & Mark Murphy, 2018. "Vanished Classmates: The Effects of Local Immigration Enforcement on Student Enrollment," NBER Working Papers 25080, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    18. Catalina Amuedo-Dorantes & Mary J. Lopez, 2015. "Falling through the Cracks? Grade Retention and School Dropout among Children of Likely Unauthorized Immigrants," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 105(5), pages 598-603, May.
    19. Daniel Bischof, 2017. "New graphic schemes for Stata: plotplain and plottig," Stata Journal, StataCorp LP, vol. 17(3), pages 748-759, September.
    20. Andrew Goodman-Bacon, 2018. "Difference-in-Differences with Variation in Treatment Timing," NBER Working Papers 25018, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    21. Comino, Stefano & Mastrobuoni, Giovanni & Nicolò, Antonio, 2016. "Silence of the Innocents: Illegal Immigrants' Underreporting of Crime and their Victimization," Economics Discussion Papers 17806, University of Essex, Department of Economics.
    22. Rhodes, S.D. & Mann, L. & Simán, F.M. & Song, E. & Alonzo, J. & Downs, M. & Lawlor, E. & Martinez, O. & Sun, C.J. & O'Brien, M.C. & Reboussin, B.A. & Hall, M.A., 2015. "The impact of local immigration enforcement policies on the health of immigrant Hispanics/Latinos in the United States," American Journal of Public Health, American Public Health Association, vol. 105(2), pages 329-337.
    23. Michael J. Moore & W. Kip Viscusi, 1989. "Promoting Safety through Workers' Compensation: The Efficacy and Net Wage Costs of Injury Insurance," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 20(4), pages 499-515, Winter.
    24. Kerwin Kofi Charles & Matthew S. Johnson & Melvin Stephens & Do Q. Lee, 2022. "Demand Conditions and Worker Safety: Evidence from Price Shocks in Mining," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 40(1), pages 47-94.
    25. Matthew Hall & Kelly Musick & Youngmin Yi, 2019. "Living Arrangements and Household Complexity among Undocumented Immigrants," Population and Development Review, The Population Council, Inc., vol. 45(1), pages 81-101, March.
    26. Catalina Amuedo‐Dorantes & Mary J. Lopez, 2017. "The Hidden Educational Costs of Intensified Immigration Enforcement," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 84(1), pages 120-154, July.
    27. East, Chloe N. & Luck, Philip & Mansour, Hani & Velasquez, Andrea, 2018. "The Labor Market Effects of Immigration Enforcement," IZA Discussion Papers 11486, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Thomas Dee & Mark Murphy, 2018. "Vanished Classmates: The Effects of Local Immigration Enforcement on Student Enrollment," NBER Working Papers 25080, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Francesco Fasani, 2018. "Immigrant crime and legal status: evidence from repeated amnesty programs," Journal of Economic Geography, Oxford University Press, vol. 18(4), pages 887-914.
    3. East, Chloe N. & Velasquez, Andrea, 2018. "The Effect of Increasing Immigration Enforcement on the Labor Supply of High-Skilled Citizen Women," IZA Discussion Papers 12029, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    4. Otsu, Yuki, 2021. "Sanctuary cities and crime," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 192(C), pages 600-615.
    5. Kayaoglu, Aysegul, 2022. "Do refugees cause crime?," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 154(C).
    6. Brandyn Churchill, 2021. "E‐Verify mandates and unauthorized immigrants' health insurance coverage," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 88(2), pages 487-526, October.
    7. Brandyn F. Churchill & Andrew Dickinson & Taylor Mackay & Joseph J. Sabia, 2022. "The Effect of E-Verify Laws on Crime," ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 75(5), pages 1294-1320, October.
    8. Jácome, Elisa, 2022. "The effect of immigration enforcement on crime reporting: Evidence from Dallas," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 128(C).
    9. Erin Todd Bronchetti & Melissa McInerney, 2012. "Revisiting Incentive Effects in Workers' Compensation: Do Higher Benefits Really Induce More Claims?," ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 65(2), pages 286-315, April.
    10. Alberto Ciancio & Camilo García-Jimeno, 2019. "The Political Economy of Immigration Enforcement: Conflict and Cooperation under Federalism," NBER Working Papers 25766, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    11. Amuedo-Dorantes, Catalina & Arenas-Arroyo, Esther & Wang, Chunbei, 2020. "Is immigration enforcement shaping immigrant marriage patterns?," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 190(C).
    12. Michael W. Toffel & Jodi L. Short, 2011. "Coming Clean and Cleaning Up: Does Voluntary Self-Reporting Indicate Effective Self-Policing?," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 54(3), pages 609-649.
    13. Dionne Pohler & Chris Riddell, 2019. "Multinationals’ Compliance with Employment Law: An Empirical Assessment Using Administrative Data from Ontario, 2004 to 2015," ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 72(3), pages 606-635, May.
    14. Wright, Austin L. & Sonin, Konstantin & Driscoll, Jesse & Wilson, Jarnickae, 2020. "Poverty and economic dislocation reduce compliance with COVID-19 shelter-in-place protocols," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 180(C), pages 544-554.
    15. Amuedo-Dorantes, Catalina & Arenas-Arroyo, Esther & Sevilla, Almudena, 2018. "Immigration enforcement and economic resources of children with likely unauthorized parents," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 158(C), pages 63-78.
    16. Benjamin Bennett & Isil Erel & Léa H. Stern & Zexi Wang, 2020. "Paid Leave Pays Off: The Effects of Paid Family Leave on Firm Performance," NBER Working Papers 27788, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    17. Ganserer, Angelika, 2021. "Non-compliance with temporary agency work regulations: Initial evidence from Germany," ZEW Discussion Papers 21-057, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
    18. Dinkelman, Taryn & Ranchhod, Vimal, 2012. "Evidence on the impact of minimum wage laws in an informal sector: Domestic workers in South Africa," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 99(1), pages 27-45.
    19. Blesse, Sebastian & Diegmann, André, 2022. "The place-based effects of police stations on crime: Evidence from station closures," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 207(C).
    20. Jo Seldeslachts & Joseph A. Clougherty & Pedro Pita Barros, 2009. "Settle for Now but Block for Tomorrow: The Deterrence Effects of Merger Policy Tools," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 52(3), pages 607-634, August.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    labor regulations; workplace safety; immigration enforcement;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • J28 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Safety; Job Satisfaction; Related Public Policy
    • J81 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor Standards - - - Working Conditions
    • I18 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:upj:weupjo:21-353. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: the person in charge (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/upjohus.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.