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Workers' Compensation: Recent Developments in Moral Hazard and Benefit Payments

Author

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  • Xuguang (Steve) Guo
  • John F. Burton Jr.

Abstract

Studies using pre-1990 data generally found benefit and frequency elasticities for workers' compensation cash benefits that exceeded, respectively, 1.0 and 0: an increase in expected benefits apparently induced (a) an even greater increase in actual benefit payments and (b) an increase in claim frequency. Researchers previously hypothesized that incentive effects for workers dominated those for employers. The authors of this study reevaluate benefit and frequency elasticities for 1975–89, using data with some advantages over those used by previous studies, and also investigate whether the elasticities changed during the years 1990–1999, when insurance policies with large deductibles increased employers' incentives to limit benefits and many states restricted benefit eligibility. For both periods, they find benefit elasticities significantly under 1.0 and frequency elasticities of about 0. They also find that much of the substantial decline in actual benefits in the 1990s was due to changes in state compensability rules and administrative stringency.

Suggested Citation

  • Xuguang (Steve) Guo & John F. Burton Jr., 2010. "Workers' Compensation: Recent Developments in Moral Hazard and Benefit Payments," ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 63(2), pages 340-355, January.
  • Handle: RePEc:sae:ilrrev:v:63:y:2010:i:2:p:340-355
    DOI: 10.1177/001979391006300209
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Ruser, John W, 1991. "Workers' Compensation and Occupational Injuries and Illnesses," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 9(4), pages 325-350, October.
    2. Leslie I. Boden & John W. Ruser, 2003. "Workers' Compensation "Reforms," Choice of Medical Care Provider, and Reported Workplace Injuries," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 85(4), pages 923-929, November.
    3. Terry Thomason & Timothy P. Schmidle & John F. Burton Jr., 2001. "Workers' Compensation: Benefits, Costs, and Safety under Alternative Insurance Arrangements," Books from Upjohn Press, W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research, number wc.
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    6. Barry T. Hirsch & David A. MacPherson & J. Michael Dumond, 1997. "Workers#x0027; Compensation Recipiency in Union and Nonunion Workplaces," ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 50(2), pages 213-236, January.
    7. Krueger, Alan B & Burton, John F, Jr, 1990. "The Employers' Costs of Workers' Compensation Insurance: Magnitudes, Determinants, and Public Policy," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 72(2), pages 228-240, May.
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    Cited by:

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    2. Richard V. Burkhauser & Maximilian D. Schmeiser & Robert R. Weathers II, 2012. "The Importance of Anti-Discrimination and Workers' Compensation Laws on the Provision of Workplace Accommodations following the Onset of a Disability," ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 65(1), pages 161-180, January.
    3. MELISSA McINERNEY & KOSALI SIMON, 2012. "The Effect of State Workers’ Compensation Program Changes on the Use of Federal Social Security Disability Insurance," Industrial Relations: A Journal of Economy and Society, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 51(1), pages 57-88, January.
    4. Dillender, Marcus, 2015. "The effect of health insurance on workers’ compensation filing: Evidence from the affordable care act's age-based threshold for dependent coverage," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 43(C), pages 204-228.

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