IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Log in (now much improved!) to save this article

What We Do not Know about the Ownership Structure of the Largest U.S. Companies?

Listed author(s):
  • Kokoreva, Maria S.

    ()

    (Corporate Finance Center, National Research University Higher School of Economics)

  • Stepanova, Anastasia N.

    ()

    (Corporate Finance Center, National Research University Higher School of Economics)

  • Karnoukhova, Elena V.

    ()

    (Corporate Finance Center, National Research University Higher School of Economics)

Registered author(s):

    The recent restructuring of the economy has led to the fact that the leaders of information technology sector — Apple, Google, Facebook, Microsoft, Amazon — became the largest companies in the world, replacing the banking and oil and gas sectors. The emergence of a large number of technology start-ups resulted in the increase of the entrepreneurial ownership. Business founders tend to issue dual class stocks to retain control over key corporate decisions. The capital structure and the Board of Directors structure alter along with changes in the ownership structure. In many large companies, more than 90% of directors have become independent. At the same time, the diversification of the board of directors is improving by the active involvement of women in decisionmaking processes. Zero debt popularity reflect the changes in the attitude to risk. The article examines the main trends in the ownership structure of the largest US companies. The research consolidates the results of theoretical and empirical research in the field of corporate governance, capital structure and ownership structure in the developed markets. We provide the analysis of the dispersed ownership as the element of AngloSaxon corporate governance model based on historical trends in the ownership structure of companies in the US. The appearance of new sectors, the rapid development of entrepreneurial ownership, the return of the popularity of dual class shares, the fashion for gender diversification in the board of directors and the phenomenon of zero debt level are illustrated by case studies of actual corporations and analytical reports. We discuss all of the identified trends in terms of risk. In order to hedge the higher business risks of new sectors the top management and investors reduce debt, invite women to the board of directors and increase the degree of independence of the board of directors.

    If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

    File URL: ftp://w82.ranepa.ru/rnp/ecopol/ep1662.pdf
    Download Restriction: no

    Article provided by Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration in its journal Economic Policy.

    Volume (Year): 6 (2016)
    Issue (Month): (December)
    Pages: 36-59

    as
    in new window

    Handle: RePEc:rnp:ecopol:ep1662
    Contact details of provider: Postal:
    82, Vernadsky pr., 117571, Moscow

    Phone: +7 (499) 956 95 86
    Fax: (095) 564-85-80
    Web page: http://www.rane.ru/
    Email:


    More information through EDIRC

    References listed on IDEAS
    Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

    as
    in new window


    1. Williamson, Oliver E, 1988. " Corporate Finance and Corporate Governance," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 43(3), pages 567-591, July.
    2. Barclay, Michael J. & Holderness, Clifford G., 1989. "Private benefits from control of public corporations," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(2), pages 371-395, December.
    3. Maurice Obstfeld & Alan M. Taylor, 2003. "Globalization and Capital Markets," NBER Chapters,in: Globalization in Historical Perspective, pages 121-188 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    4. Grossman, Sanford J. & Hart, Oliver D., 1988. "One share-one vote and the market for corporate control," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(1-2), pages 175-202, January.
    5. Andreas Haller & Christian Jaag & Urs Trinkner, 2013. "Termination charges in the international parcel market," Chapters,in: Reforming the Postal Sector in the Face of Electronic Competition, chapter 19, pages 277-293 Edward Elgar Publishing.
    6. Jensen, Michael C. & Meckling, William H., 1976. "Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 305-360, October.
    7. Saeed, Abubakr & Belghitar, Yacine & Yousaf, Amna, 2016. "Firm-level determinants of gender diversity in the boardrooms: Evidence from some emerging markets," International Business Review, Elsevier, vol. 25(5), pages 1076-1088.
    8. Jarrell, Gregg A. & Poulsen, Annette B., 1988. "Dual-class recapitalizations as antitakeover mechanisms : The recent evidence," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(1-2), pages 129-152, January.
    9. Leland, Hayne E & Pyle, David H, 1977. "Informational Asymmetries, Financial Structure, and Financial Intermediation," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 32(2), pages 371-387, May.
    10. M. Andrew Fields & Phyllis Y. Keys, 2003. "The Emergence of Corporate Governance from Wall St. to Main St.: Outside Directors, Board Diversity, Earnings Management, and Managerial Incentives to Bear Risk," The Financial Review, Eastern Finance Association, vol. 38(1), pages 1-24, February.
    11. Weisbach, Michael S., 1988. "Outside directors and CEO turnover," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(1-2), pages 431-460, January.
    12. Jean Tirole, 2006. "The Theory of Corporate Finance," Post-Print hal-00173191, HAL.
    13. Klein, April, 2002. "Audit committee, board of director characteristics, and earnings management," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 33(3), pages 375-400, August.
    14. Adams, Renée B. & Ferreira, Daniel, 2009. "Women in the boardroom and their impact on governance and performance," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 94(2), pages 291-309, November.
    15. Fama, Eugene F & Jensen, Michael C, 1983. "Separation of Ownership and Control," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 26(2), pages 301-325, June.
    16. Özgür Arslan-Ayaydin & Chris Florackis & Aydin Ozkan, 2014. "Financial flexibility, corporate investment and performance: evidence from financial crises," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 42(2), pages 211-250, February.
    17. René M. Stulz, 2007. "The Limits of Financial Globalization," Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, Morgan Stanley, vol. 19(1), pages 8-15.
    18. Diana Hechavarría & Charles Matthews & Paul Reynolds, 2016. "Does start-up financing influence start-up speed? Evidence from the panel study of entrepreneurial dynamics," Small Business Economics, Springer, vol. 46(1), pages 137-167, January.
    19. Morck, Randall & Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W., 1988. "Management ownership and market valuation : An empirical analysis," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(1-2), pages 293-315, January.
    20. Mike Burkart & Denis Gromb & Fausto Panunzi, 1997. "Large Shareholders, Monitoring, and the Value of the Firm," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 112(3), pages 693-728.
    21. Martin Ganco, 2013. "Cutting the Gordian knot: The effect of knowledge complexity on employee mobility and entrepreneurship," Strategic Management Journal, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 34(6), pages 666-686, June.
    22. Agarwal, Rajshree & Shah, Sonali K., 2014. "Knowledge sources of entrepreneurship: Firm formation by academic, user and employee innovators," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 43(7), pages 1109-1133.
    23. Upadhyay, Arun & Zeng, Hongchao, 2014. "Gender and ethnic diversity on boards and corporate information environment," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 67(11), pages 2456-2463.
    24. Clifford G. Holderness, 2009. "The Myth of Diffuse Ownership in the United States," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 22(4), pages 1377-1408, April.
    25. Farrell, Kathleen A. & Hersch, Philip L., 2005. "Additions to corporate boards: the effect of gender," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 11(1-2), pages 85-106, March.
    26. Fama, Eugene F, 1980. "Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 88(2), pages 288-307, April.
    27. Strebulaev, Ilya A. & Yang, Baozhong, 2013. "The mystery of zero-leverage firms," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 109(1), pages 1-23.
    28. Irina Ivashkovskaya & Anastasia Stepanova, 2011. "Does strategic corporate performance depend on corporate financial architecture? Empirical study of European, Russian and other emerging market’s firms," Journal of Management & Governance, Springer;Accademia Italiana di Economia Aziendale (AIDEA), vol. 15(4), pages 603-616, November.
    29. Jordan, Bradford D. & Liu, Mark H. & Wu, Qun, 2014. "Corporate payout policy in dual-class firms," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 26(C), pages 1-19.
    30. David A. Carter & Betty J. Simkins & W. Gary Simpson, 2003. "Corporate Governance, Board Diversity, and Firm Value," The Financial Review, Eastern Finance Association, vol. 38(1), pages 33-53, February.
    31. DeAngelo, Harry & DeAngelo, Linda, 1985. "Managerial ownership of voting rights : A study of public corporations with dual classes of common stock," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 33-69, March.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

    When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:rnp:ecopol:ep1662. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (RANEPA maintainer)

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

    If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.