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The European Banking Union: Will It Be a True Union without Risk Sharing?

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  • Mario Sarcinelli

    () (Dexia Crediop)

Abstract

The recent developments of the Euro crisis reveal the lack of clear or coherent thinking on the part of both the Eurozone finance ministers and the European Commission. The crisis in Cyprus is partly the consequence of decisions made on private sector involvement in the previous Greek bailout, and other such examples may be made. It is time, therefore, to look reality in the face and strengthen the structures of the EMU. The article is devoted to what has been done and what must still be done to make the European banking system more robust and less permeable to crises, and to preserve the single financial market. It looks at the initiatives of both the European Commission and the European Council to complete the EMU by creating a banking union, the doubts on the wisdom of entrusting banking oversight to the ECB, the organization of the ECB's new tasks, the continuing absence of facilities for the recovery or liquidation of banks, as well as for a Euro-wide deposit insurance, the need for some form of risk-sharing in order to stabilise the economy, and thus the recourse to a common budget and the possibility of joint debt for the Eurozone.

Suggested Citation

  • Mario Sarcinelli, 2013. "The European Banking Union: Will It Be a True Union without Risk Sharing?," PSL Quarterly Review, Economia civile, vol. 66(265), pages 137-167.
  • Handle: RePEc:psl:pslqrr:2013-24
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    File URL: http://ojs.uniroma1.it/index.php/PSLQuarterlyReview/article/view/10412/10300
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Mario Sarcinelli, 2010. ""Europa 2020", nuovo governo economico e ri-regolamentazione finanziaria: incentivi o vincoli alla crescita?," Moneta e Credito, Economia civile, vol. 63(252), pages 291-324.
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    4. Mario Sarcinelli, 2012. "Euro crisis or public debt crisis? With a remedy for the latter case," PSL Quarterly Review, Economia civile, vol. 65(262), pages 215-236.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Carlo D'Ippoliti, 2013. "Introduzione: L'Unione Europea e' "mammona" (Introduction: A Pansy European Union)," Moneta e Credito, Economia civile, vol. 66(264), pages 377-395.
    2. Botti, Fabrizio & D’Ippoliti, Carlo, 2014. "Don’t ask don’t tell (that you’re poor). Sexual orientation and social exclusion in Italy," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 49(C), pages 8-25.
    3. Mario Tonveronachi, 2013. "L'Unione Bancaria Europea. Di nuovo un disegno istituzionale incompleto (The European banking union. An incomplete institutional design, again)," Moneta e Credito, Economia civile, vol. 66(264), pages 397-413.
    4. Carlo D'Ippoliti, 2014. "Introduction: welcoming a new editorial board," PSL Quarterly Review, Economia civile, vol. 67(268), pages 3-8.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    banking union; eurozone; crisis;

    JEL classification:

    • G01 - Financial Economics - - General - - - Financial Crises
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • G18 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Government Policy and Regulation

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