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L'Unione Bancaria Europea. Di nuovo un disegno istituzionale incompleto (The European banking union. An incomplete institutional design, again)


  • Mario Tonveronachi

    () (Università degli Studi di Siena)


The proposal for a European banking union represents the more recent effort to drive the Eurozone countries towards the effective adoption of a single rulebook and a single supervisory handbook, at the same time endowing them with a centralised mechanism for the resolution of bank crises. The new institutional framework should help to disconnect banking operations from the vicissitudes of sovereign debts, to reverse the recent re-nationalisation of finance and to restore the effectiveness of ECB monetary policy. Although the new framework would mark a significant advancement with respect to the present situation, its predictable incomplete adoption, restricted to the single supervisory mechanism, coupled with the unwillingness to burden it with legacy problems, will most likely produce opposite results from its inception. Although the full implementation of the proposal would not constitute a departure from the political de-centralised design that has so far dominated the European construction, the potential fiscal implications of a centralised resolution mechanism have raised the same barriers that have so far impeded to complete the design initiated with the Maastricht Treaty.

Suggested Citation

  • Mario Tonveronachi, 2013. "L'Unione Bancaria Europea. Di nuovo un disegno istituzionale incompleto (The European banking union. An incomplete institutional design, again)," Moneta e Credito, Economia civile, vol. 66(264), pages 397-413.
  • Handle: RePEc:psl:moneta:2013:42

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Mario Tonveronachi & Elisabetta Montanaro, 2012. "Financial re-regulation at a crossroads: How the European experience strengthens the case for a radical reform built on Minsky's approach," PSL Quarterly Review, Economia civile, vol. 65(263), pages 335-383.
    2. Bernanke, Ben S., 2013. "Stress Testing Banks: What Have We Learned? : a speech at the "Maintaining Financial Stability: Holding a Tiger by the Tail" financial markets conference sponsored by the Federal Reserve Ban," Speech 624, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    3. Mario Sarcinelli, 2012. "Come difendere la globalizzazione e salvaguardare i sistemi bancari dal contagio," Moneta e Credito, Economia civile, vol. 65(257), pages 9-47.
    4. Elisabetta Montanaro, 2013. "Regole di Basilea e modelli di vigilanza: quale convergenza? (Basel rules and supervisory models: What convergence?)," Moneta e Credito, Economia civile, vol. 66(264), pages 415-442.
    5. Alessandro Roncaglia, 2013. "Le politiche di austerita' sono sbagliate," Moneta e Credito, Economia civile, vol. 66(262), pages 121-128.
    6. Mario Sarcinelli, 2013. "The European Banking Union: Will It Be a True Union without Risk Sharing?," PSL Quarterly Review, Economia civile, vol. 66(265), pages 137-167.
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    More about this item


    European Union; banking union; financial regulation;

    JEL classification:

    • E02 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - General - - - Institutions and the Macroeconomy
    • F33 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Monetary Arrangements and Institutions
    • G18 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Government Policy and Regulation


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