L'Unione Bancaria Europea. Di nuovo un disegno istituzionale incompleto (The European banking union. An incomplete institutional design, again)
The proposal for a European banking union represents the more recent effort to drive the Eurozone countries towards the effective adoption of a single rulebook and a single supervisory handbook, at the same time endowing them with a centralised mechanism for the resolution of bank crises. The new institutional framework should help to disconnect banking operations from the vicissitudes of sovereign debts, to reverse the recent re-nationalisation of finance and to restore the effectiveness of ECB monetary policy. Although the new framework would mark a significant advancement with respect to the present situation, its predictable incomplete adoption, restricted to the single supervisory mechanism, coupled with the unwillingness to burden it with legacy problems, will most likely produce opposite results from its inception. Although the full implementation of the proposal would not constitute a departure from the political de-centralised design that has so far dominated the European construction, the potential fiscal implications of a centralised resolution mechanism have raised the same barriers that have so far impeded to complete the design initiated with the Maastricht Treaty.
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Mario Tonveronachi & Elisabetta Montanaro, 2012. "Financial re-regulation at a crossroads: How the European experience strengthens the case for a radical reform built on Minsky's approach," PSL Quarterly Review, Economia civile, vol. 65(263), pages 335-383.
- Alessandro Roncaglia, 2013. "Le politiche di austerita' sono sbagliate," Moneta e Credito, Economia civile, vol. 66(262), pages 121-128.
- Bernanke, Ben S., 2013. "Stress Testing Banks: What Have We Learned? : a speech at the "Maintaining Financial Stability: Holding a Tiger by the Tail" financial markets conference sponsored by the Federal Reserve Ban," Speech 624, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
- Mario Sarcinelli, 2012. "Come difendere la globalizzazione e salvaguardare i sistemi bancari dal contagio," Moneta e Credito, Economia civile, vol. 65(257), pages 9-47.
- Mario Sarcinelli, 2013. "The European Banking Union: Will It Be a True Union without Risk Sharing?," PSL Quarterly Review, Economia civile, vol. 66(265), pages 137-167.
- Elisabetta Montanaro, 2013. "Regole di Basilea e modelli di vigilanza: quale convergenza? (Basel rules and supervisory models: What convergence?)," Moneta e Credito, Economia civile, vol. 66(264), pages 415-442.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:psl:moneta:2013:42. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Carlo D'Ippoliti)
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.