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Beaten by Bribery: Why Not Blow the Whistle?

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  • Tina Søreide

Abstract

A recent business survey reveals that firms rarely react to corruption, even when they have lost important contracts as a result. Lack of proof was not reported as the most important explanation. This paper explores disinclination to take action in the light of market structures and the potential for collusion, business efficiency, judicial institutions, and political corruption. Each of the factors may reinforce the incentives to remain silent. Considered separately, they are unable to explain the low frequency of anticorruption reactions between firms. The sum of preconditions for action suggests that firms rarely react against business corruption.

Suggested Citation

  • Tina Søreide, 2008. "Beaten by Bribery: Why Not Blow the Whistle?," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 164(3), pages 407-428, September.
  • Handle: RePEc:mhr:jinste:urn:sici:0932-4569(200809)164:3_407:bbbwnb_2.0.tx_2-2
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    Cited by:

    1. Villena, Mauricio G. & Villena, Marcelo J., 2010. "On the economics of whistle-blowing behavior: the role of incentives," MPRA Paper 35917, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 24 Mar 2010.
    2. Frédéric Boehm & Johann Graf Lambsdorff, 2009. "Corrupción y anticorrupción: una perspectiva neo-institucional," Revista de Economía Institucional, Universidad Externado de Colombia - Facultad de Economía, vol. 11(21), pages 45-72, July-Dece.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • L1 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance
    • K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law

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