Beaten by Bribery: Why Not Blow the Whistle?
A recent business survey reveals that firms rarely react to corruption, even when they have lost important contracts as a result. Lack of proof was not reported as the most important explanation. This paper explores disinclination to take action in the light of market structures and the potential for collusion, business efficiency, judicial institutions, and political corruption. Each of the factors may reinforce the incentives to remain silent. Considered separately, they are unable to explain the low frequency of anticorruption reactions between firms. The sum of preconditions for action suggests that firms rarely react against business corruption.
Volume (Year): 164 (2008)
Issue (Month): 3 (September)
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: https://www.mohr.de/jite|
|Order Information:|| Postal: Mohr Siebeck GmbH & Co. KG, P.O.Box 2040, 72010 Tübingen, Germany|
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Friedman, J.W. & Thisse, J.-F., .
"Sustainable collusion in oligopoly with free entry,"
CORE Discussion Papers RP
1084, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Friedman, James W. & Thisse, Jacques-Francis, 1994. "Sustainable collusion in oligopoly with free entry," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 38(2), pages 271-283, February.
- Friedman, J. & Thisse, J.F., 1992. "Sustainable Collusion in Oligopoly with Free Entry," Papiers d'Economie MathÃ©matique et Applications 92-18, UniversitÃ© PanthÃ©on-Sorbonne (Paris 1).
- Buccirossi, Paolo & Spagnolo, Giancarlo, 2006.
"Leniency policies and illegal transactions,"
Journal of Public Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 90(6-7), pages 1281-1297, August.
- Buccirossi, Paolo & Spagnolo, Giancarlo, 2005. "Leniency Policies and Illegal Transactions," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 74, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
- Buccirossi, Paolo & Spagnolo, Giancarlo, 2005. "Leniency Policies and Illegal Transactions," CEPR Discussion Papers 5442, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Pranab Bardhan, 1997. "Corruption and Development: A Review of Issues," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 35(3), pages 1320-1346, September.
- Celentani, Marco & Ganuza, Juan-Jose, 2002.
"Corruption and competition in procurement,"
European Economic Review,
Elsevier, vol. 46(7), pages 1273-1303, July.
- Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1994. "Politicians and Firms," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 109(4), pages 995-1025.
- Andvig, Jens Chr. & Moene, Karl Ove, 1990.
"How corruption may corrupt,"
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization,
Elsevier, vol. 13(1), pages 63-76, January.
- Seubert, Raphaela, 2005. "On the nature of the corrupt firm: Where to situate liability?," Passauer Diskussionspapiere, Volkswirtschaftliche Reihe V-33-05, University of Passau, Faculty of Business and Economics.
- Kaufmann, Daniel & Vicente, Pedro C., 2005.
8186, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Raphaela Seubert, 2005. "On the Nature of the Corrupt Firm: Where to Situate Liability?," Law and Economics 0503002, EconWPA.
- Theodore C. Bergstrom & Hal R. Varian, 1985. "When Are Nash Equilibria Independent of the Distribution of Agents' Characteristics?," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 52(4), pages 715-718.
- Bjorvatn, Kjetil & Soreide, Tina, 2005. "Corruption and privatization," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 21(4), pages 903-914, December.
- O. Compte & A. Lambert-Mogiliansky & T. Verdier, 2005. "Corruption and Competition in Procurement Auctions," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 36(1), pages 1-15, Spring.
- Ariane Lambert-Mogiliansky & Konstantin Sonin, 2003.
"Corruption and Collusion in Procurement Tenders,"
w0036, Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR).
- Ariane Lambert-Mogiliansky & Konstantin Sonin, 2006. "Collusive Market Sharing and Corruption in Procurement," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 15(4), pages 883-908, December.
- Ariane Lambert-Mogiliansky & Konstantin Sonin, 2005. "Collusive market-sharing and corruption in procurement," PSE Working Papers halshs-00590773, HAL.
- Abbott, Kenneth W & Snidal, Duncan, 2002. "Values and Interests: International Legalization in the Fight against Corruption," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 31(1), pages S141-78, January.
- Schmalensee, Richard, 1987. "Competitive advantage and collusive optima," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 5(4), pages 351-367.
- Geeta Batra & Daniel Kaufmann & Andrew H. W. Stone, 2003. "Investment Climate Around the World : Voices of the Firms from the World Business Environment Survey," World Bank Publications, The World Bank, number 15143.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:mhr:jinste:urn:sici:0932-4569(200809)164:3_407:bbbwnb_2.0.tx_2-2. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Thomas Wolpert)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.