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Corrupción y anticorrupción: una perspectiva neo-institucional

Author

Listed:
  • Frédéric Boehm

    (Cooperación Técnica Alemana (GTZ))

  • Johann Graf Lambsdorff

    (Universidad de Passau)

Abstract

Corruption is a complex and multifaceted phenomenon. The aim of this article is to open the “black box” of corrupt transactions using the framework of the New Institutional Economics. First, it examines “corrupt contracts”, the institutions that promote them, the mechanisms involved, the transaction costs and the problems faced by the actors. Then the stages of a typical corrupt agreement are described: initiation, execution and post-contractual phase. To combat corruption the understanding of how corrupt actors think and how corrupt agreements work is necessary. Finally, the potential and limitations of traditional and the more recent anti-corruption measures are analyzed.

Suggested Citation

  • Frédéric Boehm & Johann Graf Lambsdorff, 2009. "Corrupción y anticorrupción: una perspectiva neo-institucional," Revista de Economía Institucional, Universidad Externado de Colombia - Facultad de Economía, vol. 11(21), pages 45-72, July-Dece.
    • Handle: RePEc:rei:ecoins:v:11:y:2009:i:21:p:45-72
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    File URL: http://www.uexternado.edu.co/facecono/ecoinstitucional/workingpapers/fboehm21.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Juan Carlos Henao & David A. Ortiz Escobar, 2018. "Corrupción en Colombia Tomo 2 Enfoques sectoriales sobre corrupción," Books, Universidad Externado de Colombia, Facultad de Derecho, number 1025.
    2. Juan Carlos Henao & Aníbal Rafael Zárate, 2018. "Corrupción en Colombia Tomo 4 Corrupción, Estado e instrumentos jurídicos," Books, Universidad Externado de Colombia, Facultad de Derecho, number 1027.
    3. Dilia Paola Gómez Patino, 2012. "Esfuerzos internacionales en el combate a la corrupción," Revista Saber, Ciencia y Libertad, Universidad Libre - Sede Cartagena, vol. 7(2), pages 63-74, July.
    4. Frédéric Boehm, 2012. "Competencias del economista como analista y asesor político," Revista de Economía del Caribe 10270, Universidad del Norte.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Corruption; institutions; transaction costs; anti-corruption;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • B52 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - Current Heterodox Approaches - - - Historical; Institutional; Evolutionary; Modern Monetary Theory;
    • D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption

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