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Corrupción y anticorrupción: una perspectiva neo-institucional

Author

Listed:
  • Frédéric Boehm

    () (Cooperación Técnica Alemana (GTZ))

  • Johann Graf Lambsdorff

    () (Universidad de Passau)

Abstract

Corruption is a complex and multifaceted phenomenon. The aim of this article is to open the “black box” of corrupt transactions using the framework of the New Institutional Economics. First, it examines “corrupt contracts”, the institutions that promote them, the mechanisms involved, the transaction costs and the problems faced by the actors. Then the stages of a typical corrupt agreement are described: initiation, execution and post-contractual phase. To combat corruption the understanding of how corrupt actors think and how corrupt agreements work is necessary. Finally, the potential and limitations of traditional and the more recent anti-corruption measures are analyzed.

Suggested Citation

  • Frédéric Boehm & Johann Graf Lambsdorff, 2009. "Corrupción y anticorrupción: una perspectiva neo-institucional," Revista de Economía Institucional, Universidad Externado de Colombia - Facultad de Economía, vol. 11(21), pages 45-72, July-Dece.
  • Handle: RePEc:rei:ecoins:v:11:y:2009:i:21:p:45-72
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    File URL: http://www.uexternado.edu.co/facecono/ecoinstitucional/workingpapers/fboehm21.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Lambsdorff, Johann & Nell, Mathias, 2007. "Fighting corruption with asymmetric penalties and leniency," Center for European, Governance and Economic Development Research Discussion Papers 59, University of Goettingen, Department of Economics.
    2. R. Pathak & Gurmeet Singh & Rakesh Belwal & R. Smith, 2007. "E-governance and Corruption-developments and Issues in Ethiopia," Public Organization Review, Springer, vol. 7(3), pages 195-208, September.
    3. Frédéric Boehm & Juanita Olaya, 2006. "Corruption In Public Contracting Auctions: The Role Of Transparency In Bidding Processes," Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 77(4), pages 431-452, December.
    4. Husted, Bryan W., 1994. "Honor Among Thieves: A Transaction-Cost Interpretation of Corruption in Third World Countries," Business Ethics Quarterly, Cambridge University Press, vol. 4(01), pages 17-27, January.
    5. Buccirossi, Paolo & Spagnolo, Giancarlo, 2006. "Leniency policies and illegal transactions," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 90(6-7), pages 1281-1297, August.
    6. Joseph J. Spengler, 1950. "Vertical Integration and Antitrust Policy," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 58, pages 347-347.
    7. Günther G. Schulze & Björn Frank, 2003. "Deterrence versus intrinsic motivation: Experimental evidence on the determinants of corruptibility," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 4(2), pages 143-160, August.
    8. Tina Søreide, 2008. "Beaten by Bribery: Why Not Blow the Whistle?," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 164(3), pages 407-428, September.
    9. Lambsdorff, Johann Graf, 2002. "Making corrupt deals: contracting in the shadow of the law," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 48(3), pages 221-241, July.
    10. Lambert-Mogiliansky, Ariane, 2002. "Why firms pay occasional bribes: the connection economy," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 18(1), pages 47-60, March.
    11. Lars Lindblom, 2007. "Dissolving the Moral Dilemma of Whistleblowing," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 76(4), pages 413-426, December.
    12. Pranab Bardhan, 1997. "Corruption and Development: A Review of Issues," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 35(3), pages 1320-1346, September.
    13. Daniel Kaufmann & Pedro C. Vicente, 2011. "Legal Corruption," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 23(2), pages 195-219, July.
    14. Lambsdorff,Johann Graf, 2007. "The Institutional Economics of Corruption and Reform," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521872751, May.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Frédéric Boehm, 2012. "Competencias del economista como analista y asesor político," REVISTA DE ECONOMÍA DEL CARIBE 010270, UNIVERSIDAD DEL NORTE.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Corruption; institutions; transaction costs; anti-corruption;

    JEL classification:

    • B52 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - Current Heterodox Approaches - - - Historical; Institutional; Evolutionary
    • D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption

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