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Contracts obtained by means of bribery: should they be void or valid?

  • Mathias Nell


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    Article provided by Springer in its journal European Journal of Law and Economics.

    Volume (Year): 27 (2009)
    Issue (Month): 2 (April)
    Pages: 159-176

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    Handle: RePEc:kap:ejlwec:v:27:y:2009:i:2:p:159-176
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    1. Mathias Dewatripont & Philippe Aghion & Patrick Rey, 1994. "Renegotiation design with unverifiable information," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/9591, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
    2. Ogilvie Sheilagh, 2005. "The Use and Abuse of Trust: Social Capital and its Deployment by Early Modern Guilds," Jahrbuch für Wirtschaftsgeschichte / Economic History Yearbook, De Gruyter, vol. 46(1), pages 15-52, June.
    3. Stremitzer, Alexander, 2008. "Opportunistic Termination," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 226, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
    4. Lambsdorff, Johann & Nell, Mathias, 2007. "Fighting corruption with asymmetric penalties and leniency," Center for European, Governance and Economic Development Research Discussion Papers 59, University of Goettingen, Department of Economics.
    5. Joseph Farrell and Eric Maskin., 1987. "Renegotiation in Repeated Games," Economics Working Papers 8759, University of California at Berkeley.
    6. Riordan, Michael H. & Williamson, Oliver E., 1985. "Asset specificity and economic organization," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 365-378, December.
    7. Nell, Mathias, 2007. "Strategic aspects of voluntary disclosure programs for corruption offences: Towards a design of good practice," Passauer Diskussionspapiere, Volkswirtschaftliche Reihe V-52-07, University of Passau, Faculty of Business and Economics.
    8. Rose-Ackerman,Susan, 1999. "Corruption and Government," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521632935.
    9. Rose-Ackerman,Susan, 1999. "Corruption and Government," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521659123.
    10. Benoit, Jean-Pierre & Krishna, Vijay, 1991. "Renegotiation in Finitely Repeated Games," Working Papers 91-34, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
    11. Frédéric Boehm & Juanita Olaya, 2006. "Corruption In Public Contracting Auctions: The Role Of Transparency In Bidding Processes," Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 77(4), pages 431-452, December.
    12. Kingston, Christopher, 2007. "Parochial corruption," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 63(1), pages 73-87, May.
    13. Johann Graf Lambsdorff & Sitki Utku Teksoz, 2002. "Corrupt Relational Contracting," Departmental Discussion Papers 113, University of Goettingen, Department of Economics.
    14. Lambsdorff, Johann Graf, 2002. "Making corrupt deals: contracting in the shadow of the law," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 48(3), pages 221-241, July.
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