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On the Dark Side of Political Stability

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Abstract

We build a simple model highlighting the link between efficient procurement, stability, and competition. Specifically, we characterize the trade-off between political stability and economic efficiency that shapes governments’ procurement decisions in hostile or politically unstable environments.

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  • Maria Rosa Battaggion & Steven Jeremy Ntambi & Salvatore Piccolo, 2020. "On the Dark Side of Political Stability," CSEF Working Papers 565, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy.
    • Handle: RePEc:sef:csefwp:565
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    File URL: http://www.csef.it/WP/wp565.pdf
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Competition; Efficiency; Political Stability; Procurement.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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