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Noblesse oblige? Determinants of survival in a life-and-death situation

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Listed author(s):
  • Frey, Bruno S.
  • Savage, David A.
  • Torgler, Benno

Abstract

This paper explores what determines the survival of people in a life-and-death situation. The sinking of the Titanic allows us to inquire whether pro-social behavior matters in such extreme situations. This event can be considered a quasi-natural experiment. The empirical results suggest that social norms such as 'women and children first' persevered during such an event. Women of reproductive age and crew members had a higher probability of survival. Passenger class, fitness, group size, and cultural background also mattered.

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File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167-2681(10)00025-9
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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization.

Volume (Year): 74 (2010)
Issue (Month): 1-2 (May)
Pages: 1-11

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Handle: RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:74:y:2010:i:1-2:p:1-11
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jebo

Keywords: Decision under pressure Altruism Social norms Interdependent preferences Excess demand;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
  • D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
  • D64 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Altruism; Philanthropy; Intergenerational Transfers
  • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
  • D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty

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Blog mentions

As found by EconAcademics.org, the blog aggregator for Economics research:
  1. On the ethics of research cloning
    by Economic Logician in Economic Logic on 2011-04-30 14:51:00
  2. Bruno Frey is in trouble
    by matthiasgreiff in Matthias Greiff on 2011-07-07 09:28:14
  3. Fairness, culture and selfish American men
    by Economic Logician in Economic Logic on 2009-01-20 10:41:00
  4. On the ethics of research cloning
    by Economic Logician in Economic Logic on 2011-04-30 14:51:00
  5. Bruno Frey is in trouble
    by matthiasgreiff in Matthias Greiff on 2011-07-07 09:28:14
Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
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Cited by:

  1. Elinder, Mikael & Erixson, Oscar, 2012. "Every Man for Himself! Gender, Norms and Survival in Maritime Disasters," Working Paper Series 913, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.
  2. Savage David A., 2016. "Surviving the Storm: Behavioural Economics in the Conflict Environment," Peace Economics, Peace Science, and Public Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 22(2), pages 105-129, April.
  3. Mitesh Kataria & Natalia Montinari, 2012. "Risk, Entitlements and Fairness Bias: Explaining Preferences for Redistribution in Multi-person Setting," Jena Economic Research Papers 2012-061, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena.
  4. Andries Richter & Johan Grasman, 2013. "The Transmission of Sustainable Harvesting Norms When Agents Are Conditionally Cooperative," Working Papers 2013.80, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
  5. repec:qut:qubewp:wp014 is not listed on IDEAS
  6. Alexander L. Davis & Nadja R. Jehli & John H. Miller & Roberto A. Weber, 2011. "Generosity across contexts," ECON - Working Papers 050, Department of Economics - University of Zurich, revised Mar 2015.
  7. Eiji Yamamura, 2012. "Effect of Free Media on Views Regarding Nuclear Energy after the Fukushima Accident," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 65(1), pages 132-141, 02.
  8. Richter, Andries & Grasman, Johan, 2013. "The transmission of sustainable harvesting norms when agents are conditionally cooperative," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 93(C), pages 202-209.
  9. Sheu, Jiuh-Biing, 2014. "Post-disaster relief–service centralized logistics distribution with survivor resilience maximization," Transportation Research Part B: Methodological, Elsevier, vol. 68(C), pages 288-314.

This item is featured on the following reading lists or Wikipedia pages:

  1. Economic Logic blog
  2. Economic Logic blog
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