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An experimental examination of competitor-based price matching guarantees

Listed author(s):
  • Mago, Shakun Datta
  • Pate, Jennifer G.

We use experimental methods to demonstrate the anti-competitive potential of price matching guarantees in both symmetric and asymmetric cost duopolies. Our findings establish that when costs are symmetric, price matching guarantees significantly increase market prices. In markets with cost asymmetries, guaranteed prices remain high relative to prices without the use of guarantees, but the overall ability of price guarantees to act as a collusion facilitating device becomes contingent on the relative cost difference. Lesser use of guarantees, combined with lower average prices and slower convergence to the collusive level, suggests that the mere presence of cost asymmetries may curtail collusive behavior.

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File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167-2681(09)00050-X
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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization.

Volume (Year): 70 (2009)
Issue (Month): 1-2 (May)
Pages: 342-360

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Handle: RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:70:y:2009:i:1-2:p:342-360
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jebo

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