Price Guarantees, Consumer Search, and Hassle Costs
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- Pio Baake & Ulrich Schwalbe, 2013. "Price Guarantees, Consumer Search, and Hassle Costs," Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin 1335, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research.
References listed on IDEAS
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- Hamelmann, Lisa & Haucap, Justus & Wey, Christian, 2015. "Die wettbewerbsrechtliche Zulässigkeit von Meistbegünstigungsklauseln auf Buchungsplattformen am Beispiel von HRS," DICE Ordnungspolitische Perspektiven 72, University of Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE).
- Budzinski Oliver & Köhler Karoline Henrike, 2015. "Is Amazon The Next Google?," ORDO. Jahrbuch für die Ordnung von Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, De Gruyter, vol. 66(1), pages 263-288, January.
More about this item
- D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2014-02-02 (All new papers)
- NEP-COM-2014-02-02 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-IND-2014-02-02 (Industrial Organization)
- NEP-MKT-2014-02-02 (Marketing)
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