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Dynamic duopoly with best-price clauses

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  • Schnitzer, Monika

Abstract

This article investigates best-price clauses as a strategic devise to facilitate collusion in a dynamic duopoly game. Best-price clauses guarantee rebates on the purchase price if a customer finds a better price after his purchase. Two different price clauses are distinguished: "most favored customer" and "meet or release." I examine the collusive potential of both clauses in a finite-horizon duopoly model with homogeneous durable goods. In each period, new consumers enter the market. I show that in this context, meet-or-release clauses have a greater anticompetitive potential than most-favored-customer clauses.

Suggested Citation

  • Schnitzer, Monika, 1994. "Dynamic duopoly with best-price clauses," Munich Reprints in Economics 3108, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:lmu:muenar:3108
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    File URL: https://epub.ub.uni-muenchen.de/3108/1/1.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Png, I P L & Hirshleifer, D, 1987. "Price Discrimination through Offers to Match Price," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 60(3), pages 365-383, July.
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