IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/wpa/wuwple/9803001.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

The Welfare Losses from Price Matching Policies

Author

Listed:
  • Aaron S. Edlin

    (Department of Economics, University of California, Berkeley; National Bureau of Economic Research, Hoover Institution)

  • Eric R. Emch

    (Department of Economics, University of California, Berkeley)

Abstract

Several recent papers argue that price matching policies raise equilibrium prices. We add to this literature by considering potential welfare losses, which have two sources: Harberger triangles from high prices and Posner rectangles from over-entry. We compare markets with price matching and free entry to the traditional concerns of antitrust law, monopoly or cartel markets without entry. Price matching with entry leads to greater welfare losses than both monopoly and cartel in markets with a low ratio of fixed to marginal cost and low demand elasticity. We illustrate these general results using parameters from the wholesale gasoline and air travel markets, and relate our model to price matching on NASDAQ.

Suggested Citation

  • Aaron S. Edlin & Eric R. Emch, 1998. "The Welfare Losses from Price Matching Policies," Law and Economics 9803001, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 26 May 1998.
  • Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwple:9803001
    Note: 38 pages. LaTeX format (.dvi), Six figures are embedded in the text.
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://econwpa.ub.uni-muenchen.de/econ-wp/le/papers/9803/9803001.dvi.gz
    Download Restriction: no

    File URL: https://econwpa.ub.uni-muenchen.de/econ-wp/le/papers/9803/9803001.pdf
    Download Restriction: no

    File URL: https://econwpa.ub.uni-muenchen.de/econ-wp/le/papers/9803/9803001.ps.gz
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Huang, Roger D. & Stoll, Hans R., 1996. "Dealer versus auction markets: A paired comparison of execution costs on NASDAQ and the NYSE," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(3), pages 313-357, July.
    2. Severin Borenstein, 1991. "Selling Costs and Switching Costs: Explaining Retail Gasoline Margins," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 22(3), pages 354-369, Autumn.
    3. Christie William G. & Huang Roger D., 1994. "Market Structures and Liquidity: A Transactions Data Study of Exchange Listings," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 3(3), pages 300-326, June.
    4. Corts, Kenneth S., 1995. "On the robustness of the argument that price-matching is anti-competitive," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 47(3-4), pages 417-421, March.
    5. Grether, David M & Plott, Charles R, 1984. "The Effects of Market Practices in Oligopolistic Markets: An Experimental Examination of the Ethyl Case," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 22(4), pages 479-507, October.
    6. Christie, William G & Schultz, Paul H, 1994. "Why Do NASDAQ Market Makers Avoid Odd-Eighth Quotes?," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 49(5), pages 1813-1840, December.
    7. Michael Spence, 1976. "Product Selection, Fixed Costs, and Monopolistic Competition," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 43(2), pages 217-235.
    8. Doyle, Christopher, 1988. "Different selling strategies in Bertrand oligopoly," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 28(4), pages 387-390.
    9. Kandel, Eugene & Marx, Leslie M., 1997. "Nasdaq market structure and spread patterns," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 45(1), pages 61-89, July.
    10. Crocker, Keith J & Lyon, Thomas P, 1994. "What do Facilitating Practices Facilitate? An Empirical Investigation of Most-Favored-Nation Clauses in Natural Gas Contracts," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 37(2), pages 297-322, October.
    11. Christie, William G & Harris, Jeffrey H & Schultz, Paul H, 1994. "Why Did NASDAQ Market Makers Stop Avoiding Odd-Eighth Quotes?," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 49(5), pages 1841-1860, December.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Pinar Akman & Morten Hviid, 2005. "A Most-Favoured-Customer Guarantee with a Twist," Working Papers 05-8, Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia.
    2. Mago, Shakun Datta & Pate, Jennifer G., 2009. "An experimental examination of competitor-based price matching guarantees," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 70(1-2), pages 342-360, May.
    3. Raskovich, Alexander, 2007. "Retail buyer power through steering," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 96(2), pages 221-225, August.
    4. Sridhar Moorthy & Ralph A. Winter, 2006. "Price‐matching guarantees," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 37(2), pages 449-465, June.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Schwert, G. William, 1997. "Symposium on market microstructure: Focus on Nasdaq," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 45(1), pages 3-8, July.
    2. Katrina Ellis & Roni Michaely & Maureen O'Hara, 2002. "The Making of a Dealer Market: From Entry to Equilibrium in the Trading of Nasdaq Stocks," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 57(5), pages 2289-2316, October.
    3. Bacidore, Jeffrey M., 2001. "Decimalization, adverse selection, and market maker rents," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 25(5), pages 829-855, May.
    4. Duong Nguyen & Tribhuvan Puri, 2014. "Information asymmetry and accounting restatement: NYSE-AMEX and NASDAQ evidence," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 43(2), pages 211-244, August.
    5. Amihud, Yakov & Mendelson, Haim & Lauterbach, Beni, 1997. "Market microstructure and securities values: Evidence from the Tel Aviv Stock Exchange," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 45(3), pages 365-390, September.
    6. Lucy F. Ackert & Bryan K. Church, 1998. "Competitiveness and price setting in dealer markets," Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, vol. 83(Q 3), pages 4-11.
    7. Joe Chen, 2005. "The Market Structure of Nasdaq Dealer Markets and Quoting Conventions," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-357, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
    8. Christie, William G. & Schultz, Paul H., 1999. "The initiation and withdrawal of odd-eighth quotes among Nasdaq stocks: an empirical analysis," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 52(3), pages 409-442, June.
    9. Hörner, Johannes & Lovo, Stefano & Tomala, Tristan, 2018. "Belief-free price formation," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 127(2), pages 342-365.
    10. John Board & Charles Sutcliffe & Anne Vila, 2000. "Market Maker Performance: The Search for Fair Weather Market Makers," Journal of Financial Services Research, Springer;Western Finance Association, vol. 17(3), pages 259-276, September.
    11. Barclay, Michael J., 1997. "Bid-ask spreads and the avoidance of odd-eighth quotes on Nasdaq: An examination of exchange listings," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 45(1), pages 35-60, July.
    12. Kryzanowski, Lawrence & Rubalcava, Arturo, 2005. "International trade-venue clienteles and order-flow competitiveness," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 86-113, January.
    13. Ahn, Hee-Joon & Cao, Charles Q. & Choe, Hyuk, 1998. "Decimalization and competition among stock markets: Evidence from the Toronto Stock Exchange cross-listed securities," Journal of Financial Markets, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 51-87, April.
    14. Bonnie F. Van Ness & Robert A. Van Ness & Richard S. Warr, 2005. "Nasdaq Trading and Trading Costs: 1993–2002," The Financial Review, Eastern Finance Association, vol. 40(3), pages 281-304, August.
    15. Keim, Donald B. & Madhavan, Ananth, 1997. "Transactions costs and investment style: an inter-exchange analysis of institutional equity trades," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(3), pages 265-292, December.
    16. Joe Chen, 2005. "The Market Structure of Nasdaq Dealer Markets and Quoting Conventions," CARF F-Series CARF-F-040, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
    17. Boehmer, Beatrice & Boehmer, Ekkehart, 2003. "Trading your neighbor's ETFs: Competition or fragmentation?," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 27(9), pages 1667-1703, September.
    18. Gehrig, Thomas & Jackson, Matthew, 1998. "Bid-ask spreads with indirect competition among specialists," Journal of Financial Markets, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 89-119, April.
    19. Jones, Charles M. & Lipson, Marc L., 1999. "Execution Costs of Institutional Equity Orders," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 8(3), pages 123-140, July.
    20. William G. Christie & Paul H. Schultz, 1995. "Policy Watch: Did Nasdaq Market Makers Implicitly Collude?," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 9(3), pages 199-208, Summer.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law
    • L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
    • L16 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Industrial Organization and Macroeconomics; Macroeconomic Industrial Structure
    • D60 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - General

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwple:9803001. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: EconWPA (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://econwpa.ub.uni-muenchen.de .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.