What do Facilitating Practices Facilitate? An Empirical Investigation of Most-Favored-Nation Clauses in Natural Gas Contracts
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- Crocker, K.J. & Lyon, T.P., 1993. "What Do "Facilitating Practices" Facilitates? An Empirical Investigation of Most-Favored Nation Clauses in Natural Gas Contracts," Papers 10-93-2, Pennsylvania State - Department of Economics.
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