Cooperative Behavior and Social Interaction
No abstract is available for this item.
|Date of creation:||Jan 2006|
|Date of revision:||Jan 2006|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: |
Web page: http://www.econ.pitt.edu/
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- James Andreoni & Rachel Croson, 2001.
"Partners versus Strangers: Random Rematching in Public Goods Experiments,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
563824000000000132, David K. Levine.
- Andreoni, James & Croson, Rachel, 2008. "Partners versus Strangers: Random Rematching in Public Goods Experiments," Handbook of Experimental Economics Results, Elsevier.
- Andreoni,J. & Croson,R., 1998. "Partners versus strangers : random rematching in public goods experiments," Working papers 11, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
- Ellison, Glenn, 1994.
"Cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma with Anonymous Random Matching,"
Review of Economic Studies,
Wiley Blackwell, vol. 61(3), pages 567-88, July.
- Glen Ellison, 2010. "Cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma with Anonymous Random Matching," Levine's Working Paper Archive 631, David K. Levine.
- Van Huyck, John B. & Wildenthal, John M. & Battalio, Raymond C., 2002. "Tacit Cooperation, Strategic Uncertainty, and Coordination Failure: Evidence from Repeated Dominance Solvable Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 38(1), pages 156-175, January.
- Pedro Dal B�, 2005.
"Cooperation under the Shadow of the Future: Experimental Evidence from Infinitely Repeated Games,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 95(5), pages 1591-1604, December.
- Pedro Dal Bó, 2002. "Cooperation Under the Shadow of the Future: Experimental Evidence from Infinitely Repeated Games," Working Papers 2002-20, Brown University, Department of Economics.
- Nick Feltovich, 2003. "Nonparametric Tests of Differences in Medians: Comparison of the Wilcoxonâ€“Mannâ€“Whitney and Robust Rank-Order Tests," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 6(3), pages 273-297, November.
- Masaki Aoyagi & Guillaume R. Frechette, 2004. "Collusion in Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000000127, UCLA Department of Economics.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:pit:wpaper:234. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Alistair Wilson)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.