Bilateral Matching and Latin Squares
We develop a general procedure to construct pairwise meeting processes characterized by two features. First, in each period the process maximizes the number of matches in the population. Second, over time agents meet everybody else exactly once. We call this type of meetings "absolute strangers." Our methodological contribution to economics is to offer a simple procedure to construct a type of decentralized trading environments usually employed in both theoretical and experimental economics. In particular, we demonstrate how to make use of the mathematics of Latin Squares to enrich the modeling of matching economies.
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- Boel, Paola & Camera, Gabriele, 2006.
"Efficient monetary allocations and the illiquidity of bonds,"
Journal of Monetary Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 53(7), pages 1693-1715, October.
- Boel, Paola & Camera, Gabriele, 2004. "Efficient Monetary Allocations and the Illiquidity of Bonds," Purdue University Economics Working Papers 1171, Purdue University, Department of Economics.
- Diamond, Peter A, 1982. "Aggregate Demand Management in Search Equilibrium," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 90(5), pages 881-894, October.
- P. Diamond, 1980. "Aggregate Demand Management in Search Equilibrium," Working papers 268, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
- Kiyotaki, Nobuhiro & Wright, Randall, 1989. "On Money as a Medium of Exchange," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 97(4), pages 927-954, August.
- Andreoni, James & Croson, Rachel, 2008. "Partners versus Strangers: Random Rematching in Public Goods Experiments," Handbook of Experimental Economics Results, Elsevier.
- Andreoni,J. & Croson,R., 1998. "Partners versus strangers : random rematching in public goods experiments," Working papers 11, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
- James Andreoni & Rachel Croson, 2001. "Partners versus Strangers: Random Rematching in Public Goods Experiments," Levine's Working Paper Archive 563824000000000132, David K. Levine.
- Charalambos Aliprantis & Gabriele Camera & Daniela Puzzello, 2006. "Matching and anonymity," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 29(2), pages 415-432, October.
- Pedro Dal Bó, 2005. "Cooperation under the Shadow of the Future: Experimental Evidence from Infinitely Repeated Games," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(5), pages 1591-1604, December.
- Pedro Dal Bó, 2002. "Cooperation Under the Shadow of the Future: Experimental Evidence from Infinitely Repeated Games," Working Papers 2002-20, Brown University, Department of Economics.
- Smith, Vernon L, 1985. "Experimental Economics: Reply," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 75(1), pages 264-272, March. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
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