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Bilateral Matching and Latin Squares

  • Aliprantis, C. D.
  • Camera, G.
  • Puzzello, D.

We develop a general procedure to construct pairwise meeting processes characterized by two features. First, in each period the process maximizes the number of matches in the population. Second, over time agents meet everybody else exactly once. We call this type of meetings "absolute strangers." Our methodological contribution to economics is to offer a simple procedure to construct a type of decentralized trading environments usually employed in both theoretical and experimental economics. In particular, we demonstrate how to make use of the mathematics of Latin Squares to enrich the modeling of matching economies.

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Paper provided by Purdue University, Department of Economics in its series Purdue University Economics Working Papers with number 1189.

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Length: 18 pages
Date of creation: Jul 2006
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:pur:prukra:1189
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  1. Boel, Paola & Camera, Gabriele, 2006. "Efficient monetary allocations and the illiquidity of bonds," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 53(7), pages 1693-1715, October.
  2. Andreoni,J. & Croson,R., 1998. "Partners versus strangers : random rematching in public goods experiments," Working papers 11, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
  3. Diamond, Peter A, 1982. "Aggregate Demand Management in Search Equilibrium," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 90(5), pages 881-94, October.
  4. Smith, Vernon L, 1985. "Experimental Economics: Reply," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 75(1), pages 264-72, March.
  5. Charalambos Aliprantis & Gabriele Camera & Daniela Puzzello, 2006. "Matching and anonymity," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 29(2), pages 415-432, October.
  6. Pedro Dal B�, 2005. "Cooperation under the Shadow of the Future: Experimental Evidence from Infinitely Repeated Games," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(5), pages 1591-1604, December.
  7. Kiyotaki, Nobuhiro & Wright, Randall, 1989. "On Money as a Medium of Exchange," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 97(4), pages 927-54, August.
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