Five Indefinitely Repeated Games in the Laboratory
I experimentally test play in five indefinitely repeated games: a hawk-dove game, a game of chicken, a trust game, a coordination game, and a constant-sum game. I compare the different game histories that affect decision making in each of the games. Une étude expérimentale a été menée afin de tester les décisions prises lors de cinq jeux répétés où le nombre de répétitions est inconnu : un jeu de type hawk-dove, un jeu de type chicken, un jeu de confiance, un jeu de coordination et un jeu à somme constante. Les historiques des différents jeux sont comparés afin d'analyser les prises de décisions des participants dans chaque jeu.
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