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The effects of student composition on teachers' effort and students' performance: Implications for tracking, school choice, and affirmative action

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  • Kamali Shahdadi, Behrang

Abstract

The effect of sorting students based on their academic performances depends not only on direct peer effects but also on indirect peer effects through teachers' efforts. Standard assumptions in the literature are insufficient to determine the effect of sorting on the performances of students and so are silent on the effect of policies such as tracking, implementing school choice, and voucher programs. We show that the effect of such policies depends on the curvature of teachers' marginal utility of effort. We characterize conditions under which sorting increases (decreases) the total effort of teachers and the average performance of students.

Suggested Citation

  • Kamali Shahdadi, Behrang, 2021. "The effects of student composition on teachers' effort and students' performance: Implications for tracking, school choice, and affirmative action," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 130(C), pages 384-399.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:130:y:2021:i:c:p:384-399
    DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2021.08.013
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Indirect peer effects; Tracking; Lattice structure; Matching; Supermodular comparative statics;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • I21 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - Analysis of Education
    • D47 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Market Design
    • C60 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - General

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