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Wealth Effects in the Principal Agent Model

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  • Thiele, Henrik
  • Wambach, Achim

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  • Thiele, Henrik & Wambach, Achim, 1999. "Wealth Effects in the Principal Agent Model," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 89(2), pages 247-260, December.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:89:y:1999:i:2:p:247-260
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Kimball, Miles S, 1990. "Precautionary Saving in the Small and in the Large," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 58(1), pages 53-73, January.
    2. Page, Frank Jr., 1987. "The existence of optimal contracts in the principal-agent model," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 16(2), pages 157-167, April.
    3. Jewitt, Ian, 1988. "Justifying the First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(5), pages 1177-1190, September.
    4. Legros, Patrick & Newman, Andrew F., 1996. "Wealth Effects, Distribution, and the Theory of Organization," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 70(2), pages 312-341, August.
    5. Grossman, Sanford J & Hart, Oliver D, 1983. "An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 51(1), pages 7-45, January.
    6. Mookherjee, Dilip, 1997. "Wealth Effects, Incentives, and Productivity," Review of Development Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 1(1), pages 116-133, February.
    7. Eskander Alvi, 1997. "First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems: A Generalization," The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review, Palgrave Macmillan;International Association for the Study of Insurance Economics (The Geneva Association), vol. 22(1), pages 59-65, June.
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    Cited by:

    1. Renaud Bourlès, 2017. "Prevention incentives in long-term insurance contracts," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 26(3), pages 661-674, September.
    2. Günther G. Schulze & Bambang Suharnoko Sjahrir & Nikita Zakharov, 2016. "Corruption in Russia," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 59(1), pages 135-171.
    3. repec:eee:ecolet:v:157:y:2017:i:c:p:14-16 is not listed on IDEAS
    4. Keenan, Donald C. & Snow, Arthur, 2010. "Greater prudence and greater downside risk aversion," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 145(5), pages 2018-2026, September.
    5. Steve Boucher & Catherine Guirkinger, 2007. "Risk, Wealth, and Sectoral Choice in Rural Credit Markets," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 89(4), pages 991-1004.
    6. Wendelin Schnedler, 2011. "You Don't Always Get What You Pay For: Bonuses, Perceived Income and Effort," German Economic Review, Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 12(1), pages 1-10, February.
    7. Chade, Hector & Schlee, Edward, 2012. "Optimal insurance with adverse selection," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 7(3), September.
    8. Kadan, Ohad & Swinkels, Jeroen M., 2013. "Minimum payments and induced effort in moral hazard problems," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 82(C), pages 468-489.
    9. Fagart, Marie-Cécile & Fluet, Claude, 2013. "The first-order approach when the cost of effort is money," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(1), pages 7-16.
    10. Siegert, Caspar & Trepper, Piers, 2015. "Optimal tolerance for failure," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 109(C), pages 41-55.
    11. Chade, Hector & Vera de Serio, Virginia N., 2014. "Wealth effects and agency costs," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 86(C), pages 1-11.
    12. Dilip Mookherjee, 1999. "Contractual Constraints on Firm Performance in Developing Countries," Boston University - Institute for Economic Development 98, Boston University, Institute for Economic Development.
    13. Franco, April Mitchell & Mitchell, Matthew & Vereshchagina, Galina, 2011. "Incentives and the structure of teams," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 146(6), pages 2307-2332.
    14. Boucher, Stephen R. & Guirkinger, Catherine, 2007. "AJAE Appendix: Risk, Wealth and Sectoral Choice in Rural Credit Markets," American Journal of Agricultural Economics APPENDICES, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 0(Number 4), pages 1-4, November.
    15. Bel, Roland & Smirnov, Vladimir & Wait, Andrew, 2015. "Team composition, worker effort and welfare," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 41(C), pages 1-8.
    16. Kadan, Ohad & Swinkels, Jeroen M., 2013. "On the moral hazard problem without the first-order approach," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(6), pages 2313-2343.
    17. Bel, Roland & Smirnov, Vladimir & Wait, Andrew, 2012. "On Broadway and strip malls: how to make a winning team," Working Papers 2012-14, University of Sydney, School of Economics.
    18. Ligon, Ethan, 2003. "Optimal risk in agricultural contracts," Agricultural Systems, Elsevier, vol. 75(2-3), pages 265-276.

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