Wealth Effects in the Principal Agent Model

Citations

Cited by:

1. Renaud Bourlès, 2017. "Prevention incentives in long‐term insurance contracts," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 26(3), pages 661-674, September.
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   • Renaud Bourlès, 2010. "The incentive for prevention in public health Systems," IDEP Working Papers 1001, Institut d'economie publique (IDEP), Marseille, France, revised 17 Feb 2010.
2. Conning, Jonathan & Udry, Christopher, 2007. "Rural Financial Markets in Developing Countries," Handbook of Agricultural Economics, in: Robert Evenson & Prabhu Pingali (ed.), Handbook of Agricultural Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 56, pages 2857-2908, Elsevier.
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   • Guirkinger, Catherine & Boucher, Stephen R., 2004. "Risk, Wealth And Sectoral Choice In Rural Credit Markets," 2004 Annual meeting, August 1-4, Denver, CO 20077, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).
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    • Renaud Bourlès, 2025. "Prevention incentives in long-term insurance contracts," Working Papers hal-01589993, HAL.
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12. Ligon, Ethan, 2003. "Optimal risk in agricultural contracts," Agricultural Systems, Elsevier, vol. 75(2-3), pages 265-276.
13. Dilip Mookherjee, 1999. "Contractual Constraints on Firm Performance in Developing Countries," Boston University - Institute for Economic Development 98, Boston University, Institute for Economic Development.
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18. Steve Boucher & Catherine Guirkinger, 2007. "Risk, Wealth, and Sectoral Choice in Rural Credit Markets," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 89(4), pages 991-1004.
    • Guirkinger, Catherine & Boucher, Stephen R., 2004. "Risk, Wealth And Sectoral Choice In Rural Credit Markets," 2004 Annual meeting, August 1-4, Denver, CO 20077, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).
19. Chade, Hector & Swinkels, Jeroen, 2020. "The moral hazard problem with high stakes," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 187(C).
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21. Bel, Roland & Smirnov, Vladimir & Wait, Andrew, 2012. "On Broadway and strip malls: how to make a winning team," Working Papers 2012-14, University of Sydney, School of Economics.
22. Keenan, Donald C. & Snow, Arthur, 2024. "Full downside risk aversion," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 131(C), pages 93-101.
23. Kamali Shahdadi, Behrang, 2021. "The effects of student composition on teachers' effort and students' performance: Implications for tracking, school choice, and affirmative action," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 130(C), pages 384-399.
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