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Contract theory and implications for perennial energy crop contracting

Author

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  • Alexander, Corinne
  • Ivanic, Rasto
  • Rosch, Stephanie
  • Tyner, Wallace
  • Wu, Steven Y.
  • Yoder, Joshua R.

Abstract

This article provides an overview of modern contract theory and discusses the implications of the theory for contracting for perennial dedicated energy crops. We discuss some of the unique challenges of contracting for dedicated energy crops used for the production of advanced biofuels and survey some of the relevant concepts and research from the contract theory literature to address these challenges. We focus primarily on the “mechanism design” or “complete contracts” approach to contracting, which involves optimizing some objective function (e.g. profits, costs, etc.) with respect to contract terms, subject to important incentive constraints. The solution to these optimization problems typically highlight important tradeoffs that a contract designer needs to consider in order to maximize profits and/or minimize costs.

Suggested Citation

  • Alexander, Corinne & Ivanic, Rasto & Rosch, Stephanie & Tyner, Wallace & Wu, Steven Y. & Yoder, Joshua R., 2012. "Contract theory and implications for perennial energy crop contracting," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 34(4), pages 970-979.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:eneeco:v:34:y:2012:i:4:p:970-979 DOI: 10.1016/j.eneco.2011.05.013
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Galik, Christopher S., 2015. "Exploring the determinants of emerging bioenergy market participation," Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews, Elsevier, vol. 47(C), pages 107-116.
    2. Bergtold, Jason S. & Shanoyan, Aleksan & Fewell, Jason E. & Williams, Jeffery R., 2017. "Annual bioenergy crops for biofuels production: Farmers' contractual preferences for producing sweet sorghum," Energy, Elsevier, vol. 119(C), pages 724-731.
    3. Wamisho, Kassu, 2016. "The Role of Vertical Integration, Risk and Uncertainty in Biomass Supply," 2016 Annual Meeting, July 31-August 2, 2016, Boston, Massachusetts 235769, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association.
    4. McCarty, Tanner & Sesmero, Juan & Gramig, Ben, 2016. "Contracting for Perennial Energy Crops Under Uncertainty and Costly Reversibility," 2016 Annual Meeting, July 31-August 2, 2016, Boston, Massachusetts 236092, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association.
    5. Fewell, Jason E. & Bergtold, Jason S. & Williams, Jeffery R., 2016. "Farmers' willingness to contract switchgrass as a cellulosic bioenergy crop in Kansas," Energy Economics, Elsevier, pages 292-302.
    6. Rosburg, Alicia & Miranowski, John & McFadden, Jonathan, 2016. "Mitigating Feedstock Supply Risk in Corn Stover Biofuel Production," 2016 Annual Meeting, July 31-August 2, 2016, Boston, Massachusetts 235875, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association.
    7. Wamisho, Kassu & De Laporte, Aaron & Ripplinger, David, 2015. "Biomass Contracts for Ethanol Production: The Role of Farmer’s Risk Preferences," 2015 AAEA & WAEA Joint Annual Meeting, July 26-28, San Francisco, California 205703, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association;Western Agricultural Economics Association.
    8. Okwo, Adaora & Thomas, Valerie M., 2014. "Biomass feedstock contracts: Role of land quality and yield variability in near term feasibility," Energy Economics, Elsevier, pages 67-80.
    9. Glithero, N.J. & Ramsden, S.J. & Wilson, P., 2013. "Barriers and incentives to the production of bioethanol from cereal straw: A farm business perspective," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 59(C), pages 161-171.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Contract theory; Mechanism design; Biofuels; Dedicated energy crops;

    JEL classification:

    • D86 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Economics of Contract Law
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • Q42 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Energy - - - Alternative Energy Sources
    • O13 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Agriculture; Natural Resources; Environment; Other Primary Products

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