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Do employers change job offers in their online job ads to facilitate search?

Author

Listed:
  • Brencic, Vera
  • Norris, John B.

Abstract

Data from Monster.com reveal that most employers do not change the offered wage or job requirements in job ads while their ads are posted on the online job board. Only changes in requirements are associated with the employers' search costs.

Suggested Citation

  • Brencic, Vera & Norris, John B., 2010. "Do employers change job offers in their online job ads to facilitate search?," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 108(1), pages 46-48, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:108:y:2010:i:1:p:46-48
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. van Ours, Jan & Ridder, Geert, 1991. "Job requirements and the recruitment of new employees," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 36(2), pages 213-218, June.
    2. repec:pri:indrel:dsp016h440s45s is not listed on IDEAS
    3. Hall, Robert E. & Krueger, Alan B., 2008. "Wage Formation between Newly Hired Workers and Employers: Survey Evidence," IZA Discussion Papers 3775, IZA Network @ LISER.
    4. Barron, John M & Berger, Mark C & Black, Dan A, 1997. "Employer Search, Training, and Vacancy Duration," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 35(1), pages 167-192, January.
    5. David H. Autor, 2001. "Wiring the Labor Market," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 15(1), pages 25-40, Winter.
    6. Guido Menzio, 2007. "A Theory of Partially Directed Search," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 115(5), pages 748-769, October.
    7. Moen, Espen R, 1997. "Competitive Search Equilibrium," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 105(2), pages 385-411, April.
    8. Claudio Michelacci & Javier Suarez, 2006. "Incomplete Wage Posting," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 114(6), pages 1098-1123, December.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Vera Brenčič, 2012. "Wage posting: evidence from job ads," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 45(4), pages 1529-1559, November.
    2. Kuhn, Peter & Shen, Kailing & Zhang, Shuo, 2020. "Gender-targeted job ads in the recruitment process: Facts from a Chinese job board," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 147(C).
    3. Dossche, Wouter & Vansteenkiste, Sarah & Baesens, Bart & Lemahieu, Wilfried, 2026. "Anticipating delays in recruitment: Explainable machine learning for the prediction of hard-to-fill online job vacancies," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 328(2), pages 680-693.
    4. Vera Brenčič, 2016. "The impact of Craigslist’s entry on competing employment websites," IZA Journal of Labor Economics, Springer;Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit GmbH (IZA), vol. 5(1), pages 1-15, December.
    5. Brenčič, Vera, 2024. "Terms of use and network size: Evidence from online job boards and CV banks in the U.S," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 67(C).
    6. Véronique Rémy & Véronique Simonnet, 2023. "What is the best website for recruiting?," Industrial Relations: A Journal of Economy and Society, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 62(4), pages 359-379, October.
    7. Hermann Gartner & Christian Holzner, 2015. "Wage Posting as a Positive Selection Device: Theory and Empirical Evidence," CESifo Working Paper Series 5494, CESifo.
    8. Henna Nivalainen, 2014. "Internet-Based Employer Search and Vacancy Duration: Evidence from Finland," LABOUR, CEIS, vol. 28(1), pages 112-140, March.

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