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Commitment, advertising and efficiency of two-sided investment in competitive search equilibrium

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  • Masters, Adrian

Abstract

Competitive search entails both commitment to and advertising of pay-off relevant aspects of market participants. This paper considers incrementally the implications of each in a labor market where both workers and firms invest prior to market entry. A wide range of institutional arrangements are addressed within the same general framework. When the characteristics of jobs or workers are advertised the efficient outcome pertains. Commitment without advertising typically leads to market unravelling: the Diamond paradox. But, whenever wages and human capital are advertised, firms become residual claimants; the private and social returns to investment coincide. Absent wage commitment, the Hosios condition implies efficiency when investments are advertised.

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  • Masters, Adrian, 2011. "Commitment, advertising and efficiency of two-sided investment in competitive search equilibrium," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 35(7), pages 1017-1031, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:dyncon:v:35:y:2011:i:7:p:1017-1031
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    Cited by:

    1. George J. Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite & Larry Samuelson, 2017. "Premuneration Values and Investments in Matching Markets," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 127(604), pages 2041-2065, September.
    2. Kawata, Keisuke & Nakajima, Kentaro & Sato, Yasuhiro, 2016. "Multi-region job search with moving costs," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 61(C), pages 114-129.
    3. Mailath, George J. & Samuelson, Larry & Postlewaite, Andrew, 2013. "Pricing and investments in matching markets," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 8(2), May.
    4. Adrian Masters, 2012. "The value of leisure or disutility of work: Wage dispersion in a model of search with endogenous effort," Discussion Papers 12-07, University at Albany, SUNY, Department of Economics.
    5. repec:eee:jetheo:v:172:y:2017:i:c:p:202-219 is not listed on IDEAS
    6. Jerez, Belén, 2016. "Competitive Search Equilibrium with Multidimensional Heterogeneity and Two-Sided Ex-ante Investments," UC3M Working papers. Economics 23566, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía.
    7. Guerrieri, Veronica & Julien, Benoit & Kircher, Philipp & Wright, Randall, 2017. "Directed Search: A Guided Tour," CEPR Discussion Papers 12315, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    8. Adrian Masters, 2010. "Money in a Model of Prior Production and Imperfectly Directed Search," Discussion Papers 10-11, University at Albany, SUNY, Department of Economics.
    9. Benoît Julien & Sephorah Mangin, 2016. "Efficiency in Search and Matching Models: A Generalized Hosios Condition," Monash Economics Working Papers 28-16, Monash University, Department of Economics.
    10. Keisuke Kawata & Kentaro Nakajima & Yasuhiro Sato, 2013. "Analyzing the impact of labor market integration," Discussion Papers in Economics and Business 13-28, Osaka University, Graduate School of Economics and Osaka School of International Public Policy (OSIPP).
    11. Katsuya Takii, 2014. "Advertisement versus Motivation in Competitive Search Equilibrium," OSIPP Discussion Paper 14E009, Osaka School of International Public Policy, Osaka University.
    12. Masters, Adrian, 2016. "On the firms’ component of wage dispersion: Endogenous effort versus search frictions," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 42(C), pages 213-220.
    13. KAWATA Keisuke & NAKAJIMA Kentaro & SATO Yasuhiro, 2014. "Competitive Search with Moving Costs," Discussion papers 14052, Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry (RIETI).

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    Keywords

    Competitive search;

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