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Motivational Drivers of Extensive Work Effort: Are Long Hours Always Detrimental to Well‐being?

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  • Argyro Avgoustaki
  • Almudena Cañibano

Abstract

Is extensive work effort always detrimental to professionals’ well‐being? We argue that the link between extensive work effort and well‐being depends on the reasons why professionals work extended hours. Drawing on self‐determination theory and data from an international consultancy firm, we show that extrinsically driven work effort is negatively related to well‐being, while intrinsically driven work effort is positively related to well‐being. A reinforcing effect seems to exist between the two types of motivators, revealing that intrinsically driven work effort has both a direct and an indirect link to well‐being, mitigating the downsides of extrinsically driven work effort.

Suggested Citation

  • Argyro Avgoustaki & Almudena Cañibano, 2020. "Motivational Drivers of Extensive Work Effort: Are Long Hours Always Detrimental to Well‐being?," Industrial Relations: A Journal of Economy and Society, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 59(3), pages 355-398, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:indres:v:59:y:2020:i:3:p:355-398
    DOI: 10.1111/irel.12263
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