IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/anc/wpaper/203.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Effort-Based Career Opportunities and Working Time

Author

Listed:
  • Massimiliano BRATTI

    (Universit… di Milano, DEAS)

  • Stefano STAFFOLANI

    (Universita' Politecnica delle Marche, Dipartimento di Economia)

Abstract

The authors evaluate the economic effects of the hypothesis of effort-based career opportunities, described as a situation in which a firm creates incentives for employees to work longer hours than bargained (or desired), by making career prospects depend on relative working hours. Firms' personnel management policies may tend to increase working time (or workers' effort) in order to maximize profits. Effort-based career opportunities raise working time, production and output per worker, and reduce workers' utility. The authors make a first attempt to empirically estimate the relationship between hours worked and the expected opportunities of promotion using the British Household Panel Survey data set. Their analysis shows that the perceived probability of promotion increases with working time, and that this result is robust to various econometric specifications.

Suggested Citation

  • Massimiliano BRATTI & Stefano STAFFOLANI, 2004. "Effort-Based Career Opportunities and Working Time," Working Papers 203, Universita' Politecnica delle Marche (I), Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche e Sociali.
  • Handle: RePEc:anc:wpaper:203
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://docs.dises.univpm.it/web/quaderni/pdf/203.pdf
    File Function: First version, 2004
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Lazear, Edward P & Rosen, Sherwin, 1981. "Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Contracts," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 89(5), pages 841-864, October.
    2. Lazear, Edward P. & Oyer, Paul, 2004. "Internal and external labor markets: a personnel economics approach," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 11(5), pages 527-554, October.
    3. Bell, Linda A. & Freeman, Richard B., 2001. "The incentive for working hard: explaining hours worked differences in the US and Germany," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 8(2), pages 181-202, May.
    4. Hausman, Jerry, 2015. "Specification tests in econometrics," Applied Econometrics, Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration (RANEPA), vol. 38(2), pages 112-134.
    5. Stewart, Mark B & Swaffield, Joanna K, 1997. "Constraints on the Desired Hours of Work of British Men," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 107(441), pages 520-535, March.
    6. Booth, Alison L. & Francesconi, Marco & Frank, Jeff, 2003. "A sticky floors model of promotion, pay, and gender," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 47(2), pages 295-322, April.
    7. Gary Chamberlain, 1980. "Analysis of Covariance with Qualitative Data," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 47(1), pages 225-238.
    8. Heckman, James, 2013. "Sample selection bias as a specification error," Applied Econometrics, Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration (RANEPA), vol. 31(3), pages 129-137.
    9. Arulampalam, W. & Robin A. Naylor & Jeremy P. Smith, 2002. "University of Warwick," Royal Economic Society Annual Conference 2002 9, Royal Economic Society.
    10. Landers, Renee M & Rebitzer, James B & Taylor, Lowell J, 1996. "Rat Race Redux: Adverse Selection in the Determination of Work Hours in Law Firms," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 86(3), pages 329-348, June.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Mario Bossler & Philipp Grunau, 2020. "Asymmetric information in external versus internal promotions," Empirical Economics, Springer, vol. 59(6), pages 2977-2998, December.
    2. Fernando Lozano, 2010. "Understanding the workweek of foreign born workers in the United States," Review of Economics of the Household, Springer, vol. 8(1), pages 83-104, March.
    3. Renato BALDUCCI, 2005. "Public Expenditure and Economic Growth. A critical extension of Barro's (1990) model," Working Papers 240, Universita' Politecnica delle Marche (I), Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche e Sociali.
    4. Anger, Silke, 2008. "Overtime Work as a Signaling Device," EconStor Open Access Articles and Book Chapters, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, pages 167-189.
    5. Stefania BUSSOLETTI & Roberto ESPOSTI, 2004. "Regional Convergence, Structural Funds and the Role of Agricolture in the EU. A Panel-Data Approach," Working Papers 220, Universita' Politecnica delle Marche (I), Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche e Sociali.
    6. Roberto ESPOSTI & Pierpaolo PIERANI, 2005. "Price, Private Demand and Optimal Provision of Public R&D in Italian Agriculture," Working Papers 238, Universita' Politecnica delle Marche (I), Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche e Sociali.
    7. Alexis Ioannides & Eleni Oxouzi & Stavros Mavroudeas, 2014. "All work and no … pay? Unpaid overtime in Greece: determining factors and theoretical explanations," Industrial Relations Journal, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 45(1), pages 39-55, January.
    8. Argyro Avgoustaki & Almudena Cañibano, 2020. "Motivational Drivers of Extensive Work Effort: Are Long Hours Always Detrimental to Well‐being?," Industrial Relations: A Journal of Economy and Society, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 59(3), pages 355-398, July.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Massimiliano BRATTI & Stefano STAFFOLANI, 2005. "Effort-based career opportunities and working time," Departmental Working Papers 2005-02, Department of Economics, Management and Quantitative Methods at Università degli Studi di Milano.
    2. Carr, Michael D., 2011. "Work hours and wage inequality: Evidence from the 2004 WERS," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 40(4), pages 417-427, August.
    3. Sjögren Lindquist, Gabriella, 2010. "Tournaments and unfair treatment," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 39(6), pages 670-682, December.
    4. David Bell & Steffen Otterbach & Alfonso Sousa-Poza, 2012. "Work Hours Constraints and Health," Annals of Economics and Statistics, GENES, issue 105-106, pages 35-54.
    5. Jia, Lili, 2012. "Land fragmentation and off-farm labor supply in China," Studies on the Agricultural and Food Sector in Transition Economies, Leibniz Institute of Agricultural Development in Transition Economies (IAMO), volume 66, number 66.
    6. Anger, Silke, 2005. "Unpaid Overtime in Germany: Differences between East and West," EconStor Open Access Articles and Book Chapters, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, pages 17-27.
    7. René Böheim & Mark P. Taylor, 2003. "Option Or Obligation? The Determinants Of Labour Supply Preferences In Britain," Manchester School, University of Manchester, vol. 71(2), pages 113-131, March.
    8. William H. Greene & David A. Hensher, 2008. "Modeling Ordered Choices: A Primer and Recent Developments," Working Papers 08-26, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics.
    9. Wunder, Christoph & Heineck, Guido, 2013. "Working time preferences, hours mismatch and well-being of couples: Are there spillovers?," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(C), pages 244-252.
    10. Benno Torgler & Sascha L. Schmidt & Bruno S. Frey, 2006. "The Power of Positional Concerns: A Panel Analysis," CREMA Working Paper Series 2006-19, Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts (CREMA).
    11. Genda, Yuji & Kuroda, Sachiko & Ohta, Souichi, 2015. "Does downsizing take a toll on retained staff? An analysis of increased working hours in the early 2000s in Japan," Journal of the Japanese and International Economies, Elsevier, vol. 36(C), pages 1-24.
    12. Silke Anger, 2005. "Working Time as an Investment? – The Effects of Unpaid Overtime on Wages, Promotions and Layoffs," SFB 649 Discussion Papers SFB649DP2005-032, Sonderforschungsbereich 649, Humboldt University, Berlin, Germany.
    13. Wunder, Christoph, 2016. "Working hours mismatch and well-being: comparative evidence from Australian and German panel data," VfS Annual Conference 2016 (Augsburg): Demographic Change 145544, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    14. Melero Martín, Eduardo, 2004. "Evidence on Training and Career Paths: Human Capital, Information and Incentives," IZA Discussion Papers 1377, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    15. Cem Baslevent, 2014. "The Work-Life Conflict and Well-Being of Turkish Employees," Working Papers 827, Economic Research Forum, revised May 2014.
    16. Benno Torgler & Sascha L. Schmidt & Bruno S. Frey, 2008. "The Power of Positional Concerns," IEW - Working Papers 368, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
    17. Ferreira, Priscila, 2009. "The determinants of promotions and firm separations," ISER Working Paper Series 2009-11, Institute for Social and Economic Research.
    18. Benno Torgler & Sascha L. Schmidt & Bruno S. Frey, 2006. "Relative Income Position and Performance: An Empirical Panel Analysis," CREMA Working Paper Series 2006-03, Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts (CREMA).
    19. Mario Bossler & Philipp Grunau, 2020. "Asymmetric information in external versus internal promotions," Empirical Economics, Springer, vol. 59(6), pages 2977-2998, December.
    20. Dora Gicheva, 2013. "Working Long Hours and Early Career Outcomes in the High-End Labor Market," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 31(4), pages 785-824.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    bargaining; career; personnel management; promotion; welfare; working time;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • J22 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Time Allocation and Labor Supply
    • J23 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Labor Demand
    • J50 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining - - - General
    • M12 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Administration - - - Personnel Management; Executives; Executive Compensation

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:anc:wpaper:203. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: . General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/deancit.html .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Maurizio Mariotti (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/deancit.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.