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Institutional Changes Now And Benefits Tomorrow: How Soon Is Tomorrow?

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  • PIERRE-GUILLAUME MÉON
  • KHALID SEKKAT
  • LAURENT WEILL

Abstract

This paper investigates the timing of the impact of changes in checks and balances on macroeconomic efficiency in a panel of countries. Using Battese and Coelli's one-stage approach, we find that increasing checks and balances results in greater efficiency. Furthermore, the impact of institutional changes on efficiency is delayed, with a full effect showing after five to six years. This finding remains robust after distinguishing developed and developing countries, including country-fixed effects and using alternative functional forms of the production frontier and alternative measures of checks and balances. The relation is also robust to controlling for endogeneity. Copyright 2009 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

Suggested Citation

  • Pierre-Guillaume Méon & Khalid Sekkat & Laurent Weill, 2009. "Institutional Changes Now And Benefits Tomorrow: How Soon Is Tomorrow?," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 21(2), pages 319-357, July.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:21:y:2009:i:2:p:319-357
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    Cited by:

    1. Jean Lacroix & Pierre-Guillaume Méon & Khalid Sekkat, 2017. "Do democratic transitions attract foreign investors and how fast?," Working Papers CEB 17-006, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
    2. Christian Bjørnskov & Pierre-Guillaume Méon, 2015. "The productivity of trust," Post-Print CEB, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles, June.
    3. Méon, Pierre-Guillaume & Weill, Laurent, 2010. "Does financial intermediation matter for macroeconomic performance?," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 27(1), pages 296-303, January.
    4. Pierre-Guillaume Méon & Khalid Sekkat, 2016. "A time to throw stones, a time to reap: How long does it take for democratic transitions to improve institutional outcomes?," Working Papers CEB 16-016, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
    5. Gheeraert, Laurent & Weill, Laurent, 2015. "Does Islamic banking development favor macroeconomic efficiency? Evidence on the Islamic finance-growth nexus," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 47(C), pages 32-39.
    6. Méon, Pierre-Guillaume & Sekkat, Khalid, 2012. "FDI Waves, Waves of Neglect of Political Risk," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 40(11), pages 2194-2205.
    7. Khoury, Theodore A. & Peng, Mike W., 2011. "Does institutional reform of intellectual property rights lead to more inbound FDI? Evidence from Latin America and the Caribbean," Journal of World Business, Elsevier, vol. 46(3), pages 337-345, July.
    8. Cao, Shixiong, 2012. "Why China's approach to institutional change has begun to succeed," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 29(3), pages 679-683.
    9. Berggren, Niclas & Bergh, Andreas & Bjørnskov, Christian, 2012. "The growth effects of institutional instability," Journal of Institutional Economics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 8(02), pages 187-224, June.
    10. Hans Pitlik, 2017. "Austria 2025 – Public Administration Reform Between the Quest for Efficiency and Resistance to Change. A Survey," WIFO Monatsberichte (monthly reports), WIFO, vol. 90(3), pages 205-217, March.
    11. Marin Ferry, 2015. "The Carrot and Stick Approach to Debt Relief : Overcoming Moral Hazard," Working Papers DT/2015/14, DIAL (Développement, Institutions et Mondialisation).

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