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Reputation and Hierarchy in Dynamic Models of Employment

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Waldman, Michael, 2016. "The dual avenues of labor market signaling," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(C), pages 120-134.
  2. Gibbons, Robert & Murphy, Kevin J, 1992. "Optimal Incentive Contracts in the Presence of Career Concerns: Theory and Evidence," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 100(3), pages 468-505, June.
  3. Vincenzo Scoppa, 2003. "Contratti incompleti ed enforcement endogeno. Una rassegna della letteratura," Economia politica, Società editrice il Mulino, issue 3, pages 391-440.
  4. Bing Han & David Hirshleifer & John C. Persons, 2009. "Promotion Tournaments and Capital Rationing," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 22(1), pages 219-255, January.
  5. Carolyn Pitchik, 2008. "Self-Promoting Investments," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 164(3), pages 381-406, September.
  6. W. Bentley MacLeod, 1997. "Complexity, Contract and the Employment Relationship," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 342., Boston College Department of Economics.
  7. Arnaldo Camuffo, 2002. "The Changing Nature of Internal Labor Markets," Journal of Management & Governance, Springer;Accademia Italiana di Economia Aziendale (AIDEA), vol. 6(4), pages 281-294, December.
  8. De Fraja, Gianni, 2004. "Hierarchies in organisations and labour market competition," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 11(6), pages 669-686, December.
  9. David P. Myatt & Torun Dewan, 2005. "Scandal, Protection, and Recovery in Political Cabinets," Economics Series Working Papers 237, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
  10. Suman Ghosh & Michael Waldman, 2010. "Standard promotion practices versus up-or-out contracts," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 41(2), pages 301-325.
  11. Christian Lukas & Jens Robert Schöndube, 2008. "Trust and Adaptive Learning in Implicit Contracts," FEMM Working Papers 08017, Otto-von-Guericke University Magdeburg, Faculty of Economics and Management.
  12. Christian Belzil & Michael Bognanno, 2010. "The promotion dynamics of American executives," Research in Labor Economics,in: Jobs, Training, and Worker Well-being, volume 30, pages 189-231 Emerald Publishing Ltd.
  13. repec:eee:jetheo:v:169:y:2017:i:c:p:270-293 is not listed on IDEAS
  14. David N. Margolis, 1996. "Cohort Effects and Returns to Seniority in France," Annals of Economics and Statistics, GENES, issue 41-42, pages 443-464.
  15. Filson, Darren, 2000. "The dynamics of resource allocation in research organizations," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 43(2), pages 263-277, October.
  16. Junichiro Ishida, 2012. "Dynamically Sabotage-Proof Tournaments," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 30(3), pages 627-655.
  17. James M. Malcomson, 2012. "Relational Incentive Contracts," Introductory Chapters,in: Robert Gibbons & John Roberts (ed.), The Handbook of Organizational Economics Princeton University Press.
  18. MacLeod, W. Bentley, 1992. "Les contrats auto-exécutoires et la théorie des institutions du marché du travail," L'Actualité Economique, Société Canadienne de Science Economique, vol. 68(3), pages 433-451, septembre.
  19. W. Bentley MacLeod, 2007. "Reputations, Relationships, and Contract Enforcement," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 45(3), pages 595-628, September.
  20. W. Bentley MacLeod, 2006. "Reputations, Relationships and the Enforcement of Incomplete Contracts," CESifo Working Paper Series 1730, CESifo Group Munich.
  21. Waldman, Michael, 2013. "Classic promotion tournaments versus market-based tournaments," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 31(3), pages 198-210.
  22. Marini, Marco A., 2005. "The value of a new idea: knowledge transmission, workers' mobility and market structure," MPRA Paper 1687, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised Jan 2006.
  23. Kandel, Eugene & Pearson, Neil D., 2001. "Flexibility versus Commitment in Personnel Management," Journal of the Japanese and International Economies, Elsevier, vol. 15(4), pages 515-556, December.
  24. Brunello, Giorgio & Ariga, Kenn, 1997. "Earnings and seniority in Japan: A re-appraisal of the existing evidence and a comparison with the UK," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 4(1), pages 47-69, March.
  25. Claudia Olivetti & Stefania Albanesi, 2005. "Home Production, Market Production and the Gender Wage Gap: Incentives and Expectations," Boston University - Department of Economics - Working Papers Series WP2005-013, Boston University - Department of Economics.
  26. Forestier, Albane, 2005. "Principle-agent problems in the French slave trade: the case of Rochelais Armateurs and their agents, 1763-1792," Economic History Working Papers 22478, London School of Economics and Political Science, Department of Economic History.
  27. Jed DeVaro & Michael Waldman, 2012. "The Signaling Role of Promotions: Further Theory and Empirical Evidence," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 30(1), pages 91-147.
  28. Tan, Danchi & Mahoney, Joseph T., 2002. "An Empirical Investigation of Expatriate Utilization: Resource-Based, Agency, and Transaction Costs Perspectives," Working Papers 02-0129, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, College of Business.
  29. van Dalen, H.P. & Henkens, K., 2015. "Why Demotion of Older Workers is a No-Go Area for Managers," Discussion Paper 2015-025, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  30. Yang, Der-Yuan, 2008. "On the elements and practices of monitoring," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 65(3-4), pages 654-666, March.
  31. DeVaro, Jed, 2011. "Using "opposing responses" and relative performance to distinguish empirically among alternative models of promotions," MPRA Paper 35175, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  32. Marie Claire Villeval, 2005. "Nouvelles conditions de travail : satisfaction ou résignation ?," Post-Print halshs-00157177, HAL.
  33. Colombo, Ferdinando & Merzoni, Guido, 2006. "In praise of rigidity: The bright side of long-term contracts in repeated trust games," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 59(3), pages 349-373, March.
  34. Alexander K. Koch & Julia Nafziger, 2012. "Job Assignments under Moral Hazard: The Peter Principle Revisited," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 21(4), pages 1029-1059, December.
  35. James M. Malcomson, 2016. "Relational Incentive Contracts With Persistent Private Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 84, pages 317-346, January.
  36. Ferdinando Colombo & Guido Merzoni, 2008. "For how long to tie your hands? Stable relationships in an unstable environment," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 95(2), pages 93-120, November.
  37. Andrew Weiss & Ruqu Wang, 1990. "A Sorting Model of Labor Contracts: Implications for Layoffs and Wage-Tenure Profiles," NBER Working Papers 3448, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  38. B. Kriechel & G. A. Pfann, 2013. "Workforce reorganization and the worker," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 45(13), pages 1719-1729, May.
  39. Ján Zábojník, 2012. "Promotion tournaments in market equilibrium," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 51(1), pages 213-240, September.
  40. Luis Rayo, 2002. "Relational Team Incentives and Ownership," Theory workshop papers 357966000000000087, UCLA Department of Economics.
  41. Bortolotti, Stefania & Devetag, Giovanna & Ortmann, Andreas, 2016. "Group incentives or individual incentives? A real-effort weak-link experiment," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 56(C), pages 60-73.
  42. Holmstrom, Bengt R. & Tirole, Jean, 1989. "The theory of the firm," Handbook of Industrial Organization,in: R. Schmalensee & R. Willig (ed.), Handbook of Industrial Organization, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 2, pages 61-133 Elsevier.
  43. MacLeod, W Bentley & Malcomson, James M & Gomme, Paul, 1994. "Labor Turnover and the Natural Rate of Unemployment: Efficiency Wage versus Frictional Unemployment," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 12(2), pages 276-315, April.
  44. Stuart S. Rosenthal & William C. Strange, 2003. "Agglomeration, Labor Supply, and the Urban Rat Race," Center for Policy Research Working Papers 57, Center for Policy Research, Maxwell School, Syracuse University.
  45. Luis Garicano & Luis Rayo, 2016. "Why Organizations Fail: Models and Cases," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 54(1), pages 137-192, March.
  46. repec:cup:jechis:v:78:y:2018:i:02:p:500-538_00 is not listed on IDEAS
  47. Jed DeVaro & Antti Kauhanen, 2016. "An “Opposing Responses” Test of Classic versus Market-Based Promotion Tournaments," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 34(3), pages 747-779.
  48. repec:eee:labchp:v:3:y:1999:i:pb:p:2291-2372 is not listed on IDEAS
  49. Xin Jin, 2014. "The Signaling Role of Not Being Promoted: Theory and Evidence," Working Papers 0314, University of South Florida, Department of Economics.
  50. Jon Strand, 1996. "Employment and wages with sector-specific shocks and worker moral hazard," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 63(2), pages 151-173, June.
  51. Robert Gibbons & Michael Waldman, 1998. "A Theory of Wage and Promotion Dynamics in Internal Labor Markets," NBER Working Papers 6454, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  52. Ernesto Villanueva, 2004. "Compensating wage differentials and voluntary job changes: Evidence from West Germany," Economics Working Papers 738, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
  53. David G. Pearce, 1991. "Repeated Games: Cooperation and Rationality," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 983, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  54. repec:aea:aecrev:v:107:y:2017:i:7:p:1753-77 is not listed on IDEAS
  55. Chen, Jiawei & Shum, Matthew, 2010. "Estimating a tournament model of intra-firm wage differentials," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 155(1), pages 39-55, March.
  56. André Zylberberg, 1994. "Effort et contrats : quelques enseignements concernant le marché du travail," Économie et Prévision, Programme National Persée, vol. 113(2), pages 1-20.
  57. Xiaopeng Xu, 2002. "Quality over-provision of information goods," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 12(5), pages 1-9.
  58. Pawel Sobkowicz, 2010. "Dilbert-Peter Model of Organization Effectiveness: Computer Simulations," Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, vol. 13(4), pages 1-4.
  59. Etro, Federico, 2018. "The Economics of Renaissance Art," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 78(02), pages 500-538, June.
  60. Daniel Parent, 2009. "The effect of pay-for-performance contracts on wages," Empirical Economics, Springer, vol. 36(2), pages 269-295, May.
  61. repec:eee:labchp:v:3:y:1999:i:pb:p:2373-2437 is not listed on IDEAS
  62. repec:ebl:ecbull:v:12:y:2002:i:5:p:1-9 is not listed on IDEAS
  63. Jan Zabojnik, 2008. "Promotion Tournaments in Market Equilibrium," Working Papers 1193, Queen's University, Department of Economics.
  64. Jin, Xin, 2014. "The Signaling Role of Note Being Promoted: Theory and Evidence," MPRA Paper 58484, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  65. Robert Gibbons, 1996. "Incentives and Careers in Organizations," NBER Working Papers 5705, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  66. Prasad, Suraj & Tran, Hien, 2013. "Work practices, incentives for skills, and training," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 23(C), pages 66-76.
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