Task Assignment and Agency Structures
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- Hoppe, Eva I. & Kusterer, David J., 2011.
"Conflicting tasks and moral hazard: Theory and experimental evidence,"
European Economic Review,
Elsevier, vol. 55(8), pages 1094-1108.
- Eva I. Hoppe & David J. Kusterer, 2010. "Conflicting Tasks and Moral Hazard: Theory and Experimental Evidence," Cologne Graduate School Working Paper Series 01-04, Cologne Graduate School in Management, Economics and Social Sciences.
- Dongsoo Shin & Roland Strausz, 2014. "Delegation and dynamic incentives," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 45(3), pages 495-520, September.
- Esther Gal-Or, 1997. "Multiprincipal Agency Relationships as Implied by Product Market Competition," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 6(1), pages 235-256, June.
- Schmitz, Patrick W., 2013. "Job design with conflicting tasks reconsidered," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 57(C), pages 108-117.
- Harvey S. James Jr., 1997. "A Legal Basis for Workers as Agents: Employment Contracts, Common Law, and the Theory of the Firm," Law and Economics 9705001, EconWPA, revised 04 Feb 2002.
- Harvey James & Derek Johnson, 2002. "Why Are There Explicit Contracts of Employment?," Law and Economics 0202001, EconWPA.
- Edward Simpson Prescott & Robert M. Townsend, 2003. "Mechanism design and assignment models," Working Paper 03-09, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond.
- Schmitz, Patrick W, 2010. "Should a principal hire one agent or two agents to perform two sequential tasks?," CEPR Discussion Papers 7976, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Lewis, Tracy R & Sappington, David E M, 1997. "Information Management in Incentive Problems," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 105(4), pages 796-821, August.
- Harvey S. James Jr, 2000. "Separating contract from governance," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 21(2), pages 47-61.
- Shin, Dongsoo, 2015. "Incentives and management styles," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 40(C), pages 22-31.
- Harvey S. James Jr., 1997. "A Tale of Two Wages: Separating Contract from Governance," Microeconomics 9705001, EconWPA.
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