A Legal Basis for Workers as Agents: Employment Contracts, Common Law, and the Theory of the Firm
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More about this item
KeywordsEmployment contracts; managerial control; agency relations; common law; transaction cost economics;
- K31 - Law and Economics - - Other Substantive Areas of Law - - - Labor Law
- D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
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