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Coase (1937) revisited: Endogenous fiat in firms and markets

  • Giorgio Zanarone

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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s12232-012-0155-z
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    Article provided by Springer & Happiness Economics and Interpersonal Relations (HEIRS) in its journal International Review of Economics.

    Volume (Year): 59 (2012)
    Issue (Month): 2 (July)
    Pages: 201-221

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    Handle: RePEc:spr:inrvec:v:59:y:2012:i:2:p:201-221
    Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.springer.com

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    Order Information: Web: http://www.springer.com/economics/policy/journal/12232/PS2

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    14. Arturs Kalnins, 2004. "Relationships and Hybrid Contracts: An Analysis of Contract Choice in Information Technology," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 20(1), pages 207-229, April.
    15. Brickley, J.A. & Dark, F.H. & Weisbach, M.S., 1988. "The Economic Effects Of Franchise Termination Laws," Papers 88-11, Rochester, Business - Managerial Economics Research Center.
    16. Alan B. Krueger, 1991. "Ownership, Agency, and Wages: An Examination of Franchising in the Fast Food Industry," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 106(1), pages 75-101.
    17. Lafontaine, Francine & Slade, Margaret E, 1997. "Retail Contracting: Theory and Practice," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 45(1), pages 1-25, March.
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    21. Jonathan Levin, 2000. "Relational Incentive Contracts," Working Papers 01002, Stanford University, Department of Economics.
    22. Masten, Scott E, 1988. "A Legal Basis for the Firm," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 4(1), pages 181-98, Spring.
    23. George Baker & Robert Gibbons & Kevin J. Murphy, 2002. "Relational Contracts and the Theory of the Firm," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 117(1), pages 39-84.
    24. Kenneth S. Corts, 2004. "The Effect of Repeated Interaction on Contract Choice: Evidence from Offshore Drilling," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 20(1), pages 230-260, April.
    25. Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, 1971. "Production, Information Costs and Economic Organizations," UCLA Economics Working Papers 10A, UCLA Department of Economics.
    26. Brickley, James A. & Dark, Frederick H., 1987. "The choice of organizational form The case of franchising," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 401-420, June.
    27. Eric Van den Steen, 2010. "Interpersonal Authority in a Theory of the Firm," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 100(1), pages 466-90, March.
    28. Silke Januszewski Forbes & Mara Lederman, 2009. "Adaptation and Vertical Integration in the Airline Industry," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 99(5), pages 1831-49, December.
    29. MacLeod, W Bentley & Malcomson, James M, 1989. "Implicit Contracts, Incentive Compatibility, and Involuntary Unemployment," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 57(2), pages 447-80, March.
    30. Chong-En Bai & Zhigang Tao, 2000. "Contract Mixing in Franchising as a Mechanism for Public-Good Provision," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 9(1), pages 85-113, 03.
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