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Age and opportunities for promotion

Using a panel of new firms and their employees, this paper studies the promotion opportunities for older workers within the same firm. Survival analysis suggests that younger employees experience shorter times to promotion than older workers and, therefore, the latter face a smaller likelihood of promotion. Although men are promoted more often than women, empirical results show that women have shorter survival times to promotion than men. Also, previous promotions are stronger determinants of subsequent ones and this finding provides support to the evidence on promotion “fast-tracks”.

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File URL: http://www3.eeg.uminho.pt/economia/nipe/docs/2011/NIPE_WP_03_2011.pdf
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Paper provided by NIPE - Universidade do Minho in its series NIPE Working Papers with number 03/2011.

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Date of creation: 2011
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Handle: RePEc:nip:nipewp:03/2011
Contact details of provider: Postal: Núcleo de Investigação em Políticas Económicas, Escola de Economia e Gestão, Universidade do Minho, P-4710-057 Braga, Portugal
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