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Citations for "A Positive Theory of Discretionary Policy, the Cost of Democratic Government and the Benefits of a Constitution"

by Cukierman, Alex & Meltzer, Allan H

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  1. Joseph G. Haubrich & Joseph A. Ritter, 1996. "Dynamic commitment and imperfect policy rules," Working Paper 9601, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland.
  2. Henrik Jordahl, 2006. "An economic analysis of voting in Sweden," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 127(3), pages 251-265, June.
  3. Sorensen, Bent E. & Wu, Lisa & Yosha, Oved, 2001. "Output fluctuations and fiscal policy: U.S. state and local governments 1978-1994," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 45(7), pages 1271-1310.
  4. Bonomo, Marco Antônio Cesar & Terra, Maria Cristina T., 2005. "Special interests and political business cycles," FGV/EPGE Economics Working Papers (Ensaios Economicos da EPGE) 597, FGV/EPGE - Escola Brasileira de Economia e Finanças, Getulio Vargas Foundation (Brazil).
  5. Caselli, Francesco & Morelli, Massimo, 2004. "Bad politicians," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 88(3-4), pages 759-782, March.
  6. Marcos Yamada Nakaguma & Siegfried Bender, 2004. "A Emenda Da Reeleição E A Lei De Responsabilidade Fiscal: Impactos Sobre Ciclos Políticos E Performance Fiscal Dos Estados (1986-2002)," Anais do XXXII Encontro Nacional de Economia [Proceedings of the 32th Brazilian Economics Meeting] 025, ANPEC - Associação Nacional dos Centros de Pósgraduação em Economia [Brazilian Association of Graduate Programs in Economics].
  7. Geys, Benny, 2006. "Government weakness and electoral cycles in local public debt: evidence from Flemish municipalities
    [Regierungsschwäche und Wahlzyklen in Zeiten kommunaler Verschuldung: das Beispiel flämischer Kom
    ," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Processes and Governance SP II 2006-06, Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB).
  8. Maxime MENUET & Patrick VILLIEU, 2015. "Why are Reforms incomplete? Reputation versus the "need for enemies"," LEO Working Papers / DR LEO 2090, Orleans Economics Laboratory / Laboratoire d'Economie d'Orleans (LEO), University of Orleans.
  9. Stein, Ernesto H. & Streb, Jorge M., 1998. "Political stabilization cycles in high-inflation economies," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 56(1), pages 159-180, June.
  10. Manjhi, Ganesh & Keswani Mehra, Meeta, 2015. "Dynamics of Political Budget Cycle," MPRA Paper 68791, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  11. Alesina, A. & Londregan, J.A. & Rosenthal, H., 1990. "A Model Of The Political Economy Of The United States," GSIA Working Papers 1990-27, Carnegie Mellon University, Tepper School of Business.
  12. Juan Carlos Berganza, 2000. "Politicians, voters and electoral processes: an overview," Investigaciones Economicas, Fundación SEPI, vol. 24(3), pages 501-543, September.
  13. Linda Veiga & Francisco Veiga, 2007. "Political business cycles at the municipal level," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 131(1), pages 45-64, April.
  14. Sergey Sinelnikov & Pavel Kadochnikov & Ilya Trunin, 2008. "From Elections to Appointments of the Regional Governors: Major Challenges and Outcomes," Published Papers 2, Gaidar Institute for Economic Policy, revised 2008.
  15. Alberto Alesina & Alex Cukierman, 1990. "The Politics of Ambiguity," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 105(4), pages 829-850.
  16. Georgios Efthyvoulou, 2012. "Political budget cycles in the European Union and the impact of political pressures," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 153(3), pages 295-327, December.
  17. Hamlett, Cathy A., 1987. "Private provision of local rural roads," ISU General Staff Papers 198701010800009541, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
  18. Steven A. Block & Paul M. Vaaler, 2001. "The Price of Democracy: Sovereign Risk Ratings, Bond Spreads and Political Business Cycles in Developing Countries," CID Working Papers 82, Center for International Development at Harvard University.
  19. Cowen, Tyler & Glazer, Amihai & Zajc, Katarina, 2000. "Credibility may require discretion, not rules," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 76(2), pages 295-306, May.
  20. Kenneth Rogoff & Anne Sibert, 1988. "Elections and Macroeconomic Policy Cycles," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 55(1), pages 1-16.
  21. Baskaran, Thushyanthan & Brender, Adi & Blesse, Sebastian & Reingewertz, Yaniv, 2016. "Revenue decentralization, central oversight and the political budget cycle: Evidence from Israel," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 42(C), pages 1-16.
  22. Margarita Katsimi & Vassilis Sarantides, 2012. "Do elections affect the composition of fiscal policy in developed, established democracies?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 151(1), pages 325-362, April.
  23. repec:eee:macchp:v2-2599 is not listed on IDEAS
  24. Fabio Padovano & Grazia Sgarra & Nadia Fiorino, 2003. "Judicial Branch, Checks and Balances and Political Accountability," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 14(1), pages 47-70, March.
  25. Laopodis, Nikiforos T. & Merika, Anna A. & Triantafillou, Annie, 2016. "Unraveling the political budget cycle nexus in Greece," Research in International Business and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 36(C), pages 13-27.
  26. Block, Steven A., 2002. "Political business cycles, democratization, and economic reform: the case of Africa," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 67(1), pages 205-228, February.
  27. Marco Bonomo & Cristina Terra, 2005. "Elections And Exchange Rate Policy Cycles," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 17, pages 151-176, 07.
  28. Thierry Warin & Kenneth Donahue, 2006. "The Stability and Growth Pact: A European Answer to the Political Budget Cycle?," Middlebury College Working Paper Series 0606, Middlebury College, Department of Economics.
  29. Joseph G. Haubrich & Joseph A. Ritter, 1992. "Commitment as irreversible investment," Working Paper 9217, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland.
  30. Tabellini, Guido, 1990. "Domestic politics and the international coordination of fiscal policies," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 28(3-4), pages 245-265, May.
  31. Alberto Alesina & Andrea Passalacqua, 2015. "The Political Economy of Government Debt," NBER Working Papers 21821, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  32. Karen K. Lewis, 1990. "Why Doesn't Society Minimize Central Bank Secrecy?," NBER Working Papers 3397, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  33. Hans Gersbach, 2004. "Competition of Politicians for Incentive Contracts and Elections," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 121(1), pages 157-177, October.
  34. Vasilev, Aleksandar, 2016. "Is consumption-Laffer curve hump-shaped? The role of VAT evasion," EconStor Preprints 147001, ZBW - German National Library of Economics.
  35. Marco E. Terrones, 1991. "Macroeconomic policy and elections: Theories and challenges," Estudios Económicos, El Colegio de México, Centro de Estudios Económicos, vol. 6(2), pages 173-195.
  36. Dimitris K. Christopoulos & John Loizides & Efthymios G. Tsionas, 2009. "Electoral Motives, Partisan Motives And Dynamic Optimality With Many Taxes: An International Investigation," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 56(1), pages 94-113, February.
  37. Alesina, Alberto Francesco, 1989. "Comments on ‘Alternative Models of Political Business Cycles’ by W.D. Nordhaus," Scholarly Articles 12553719, Harvard University Department of Economics.
  38. Andrés Escobar Arango, 1996. "Ciclos políticos y ciclos económicos en Colombia: 1950 - 1994," COYUNTURA ECONÓMICA, FEDESARROLLO, March.
  39. Susanna-maria Paleologou, 2005. "Political manoeuvrings as sources of measurement errors in forecasts," Journal of Forecasting, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 24(5), pages 311-324.
  40. Ozkan, F Gulcin, 1998. "Partisan Business and Budget Cycles with Separate Fiscal and Monetary Authorities," The Manchester School of Economic & Social Studies, University of Manchester, vol. 66(2), pages 178-195, March.
  41. Efthyvoulou, Georgios, 2011. "Political cycles under external economic constraints: Evidence from Cyprus," Journal of Economics and Business, Elsevier, vol. 63(6), pages 638-662.
  42. Paola Assael & Felipe Larraín, 1994. "El Ciclo Político-económico: Teoría, Evidencia y Extensión para una Economía Abierta," Latin American Journal of Economics-formerly Cuadernos de Economía, Instituto de Economía. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile., vol. 31(92), pages 87-114.
  43. Margarita Katsimi & Vassilis Sarantides, 2010. "Do Elections Affect the Composition of Fiscal Policy?," CESifo Working Paper Series 2908, CESifo Group Munich.
  44. Eric Dubois, 2016. "Political Business Cycles 40 Years after Nordhaus," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) hal-01291401, HAL.
  45. Bizer, David S. & Durlauf, Steven N., 1990. "Testing the positive theory of government finance," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 26(1), pages 123-141, August.
  46. Kellermann, Kersten, 2007. "Debt financing of public investment: On a popular misinterpretation of "the golden rule of public sector borrowing"," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 23(4), pages 1088-1104, December.
  47. repec:hal:journl:hal-01291401 is not listed on IDEAS
  48. repec:zbw:espost:170564 is not listed on IDEAS
  49. Minea, Alexandru & Tapsoba, René, 2014. "Does inflation targeting improve fiscal discipline?," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 40(C), pages 185-203.
  50. Cleomar Gomes da silva & Flavio V. Vieira, 2016. "Monetary policy decision making: the role of ideology, institutions and central bank independence," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 36(4), pages 2051-2062.
  51. repec:eee:reecon:v:71:y:2017:i:3:p:373-383 is not listed on IDEAS
  52. Kenneth Scheve, 2003. "Public demand for low inflation," Bank of England working papers 172, Bank of England.
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