The New Political Macroeconomics in Modern Macroeconomics and Its Appliance to Transition Processes in Serbia
This study deals with important issues related to the new political macroeconomics and its appliance to the economic movements in Serbia, which is a country of “new democracy” as well as with transition economy. In political macroeconomics, it is a known fact that the economic policy instruments can be used for political purposes – simulated improvement of economic indicators to win the elections. These options assume specific features in transition economies, such as the Serbian economy. The political instability in Serbia, reflected in frequent elections, as well as in the diversity in political and economic goals of the key political parties leading to increasing political uncertainty in both the pre-election and post-election periods, weakened the economic system. Simultaneously, using the economic policy for political purposes to support the “pro-democratic” and “pro-European” parties proved to be paradoxically justified.
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Carlin, Wendy & Soskice, David, 2005. "Macroeconomics: Imperfections, Institutions, and Policies," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780198776222, December.
- Kenneth Rogoff, 1987.
"Equilibrium Political Budget Cycles,"
NBER Working Papers
2428, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Acemoglu,Daron & Robinson,James A., 2009.
"Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy,"
Cambridge University Press, number 9780521671422, December.
- Richard T. Froyen & Alfred V. Guender, 2007. "Optimal Monetary Policy under Uncertainty," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 12510, June.
- Brender, Adi & Drazen, Allan, 2003. "Where Does the Political Budget Cycle Really Come From?," CEPR Discussion Papers 4049, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Alberto Alesina, 1987. "Macroeconomic Policy in a Two-Party System as a Repeated Game," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 102(3), pages 651-678.
- Alesina, Alberto, 1987. "Macroeconomic Policy in a Two-party System as a Repeated Game," Scholarly Articles 4552531, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- William D. Nordhaus, 1975. "The Political Business Cycle," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 42(2), pages 169-190.
- Brender, Adi & Drazen, Allan, 2005.
"Political budget cycles in new versus established democracies,"
Journal of Monetary Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 52(7), pages 1271-1295, October.
- Adi Brender & Allan Drazen, 2004. "Political Budget Cycles in New versus Established Democracies," NBER Working Papers 10539, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Brian Snowdon & Howard R. Vane, 2005. "Modern Macroeconomics," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 3092, June.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:voj:journl:v:58:y:2011:i:3:p:545-557. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Ivana Horvat)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.