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Domestic Politics and the International Coordination of Fiscal Policies

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  • Tabellini, Guido

Abstract

This paper investigates the desirability of international fiscal policy coordination in the presence of a domestic political distortion. The domestic distortion results from the inability of the current policy-maker to enter into a binding agreement with future policy-makers about the composition of public spending. This distortion generates a bias towards budget deficits. International coordination can exacerbate this bias, and thus reduce social welfare at home and abroad. The reason is that international coordination enables the domestic and foreign governments to form a coalition that excludes future policy-makers. This international coalition reduces the cost of running a budget deficit, and thus enhances the adverse effects of the domestic political distortion.

Suggested Citation

  • Tabellini, Guido, 1988. "Domestic Politics and the International Coordination of Fiscal Policies," CEPR Discussion Papers 226, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    • Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:226
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    Cited by:

    1. Antonio Pacifico, 2019. "Panel Bayesian VAR Modeling for Policy and Forecasting when dealing with confounding and latent effects," Journal of Statistical and Econometric Methods, SCIENPRESS Ltd, vol. 8(1), pages 1-1.
    2. Willem H. Buiter & Anne Sibert & Anne C. Sibert, 2011. "Government Budget Deficits in Large Open Economies," CESifo Working Paper Series 3476, CESifo.
    3. Shin‐Ichi Fukuda, 1992. "Why Does A Two‐Party System Exist?: A New Economic Explanation," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 4(3), pages 277-288, November.
    4. Joseph Daniels & David VanHoose, 1998. "Two-Country Models of Monetary and Fiscal Policy: What Have We Learned? What More Can We Learn?," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 9(3), pages 265-284, July.
    5. Conconi, Paola & Sahuguet, Nicolas, 2009. "Policymakers' horizon and the sustainability of international cooperation," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 93(3-4), pages 549-558, April.
    6. Jeffrey A. Frankel, 2016. "International Coordination," NBER Working Papers 21878, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    7. van der Ploeg, F., 1989. "Two essays on political economy," Discussion Paper 1989-9, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    8. Jay Bryson & Henrik Jensen & David Hoose, 1993. "Rules, discretion, and international monetary and fiscal policy coordination," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 4(2), pages 117-132, June.
    9. Jaewoo Lee & Michelle R. Garfinkel, 2000. "Political Influence and the Dynamic Consistency of Policy," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(3), pages 649-666, June.
    10. Rui Alves & Oscar Afonso, 2007. "The "New" Stability and Growth Pact: More Flexible, Less Stupid?," Intereconomics: Review of European Economic Policy, Springer;ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics;Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS), vol. 42(4), pages 218-225, July.
    11. Arai, Real & Naito, Katsuyuki & Ono, Tetsuo, 2018. "Intergenerational policies, public debt, and economic growth: A politico-economic analysis," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 166(C), pages 39-52.
    12. Willem H. Buiter & Anne C. Sibert, 2003. "Cross-Border Tax Externalities: Are Budget Deficits too Small?," Levine's Bibliography 666156000000000430, UCLA Department of Economics.
    13. Guido Tabellini, 2003. "Principles of Policymaking in the European Union: An Economic Perspective," CESifo Economic Studies, CESifo Group, vol. 49(1), pages 75-102.
    14. Banerjee, Gaurango, 2001. "Rules and discretion with common central bank and separate fiscal authorities," Journal of Economics and Business, Elsevier, vol. 53(1), pages 45-68.
    15. Carmen Díaz-Roldán, "undated". "Coordination of Fiscal Policies in a Monetary Union," Working Papers on International Economics and Finance 00-09, FEDEA.
    16. Antonio Caleiro, 2011. "On the Electoral Dimension of International Policy Coordination," International Journal of Finance, Insurance and Risk Management, International Journal of Finance, Insurance and Risk Management, vol. 1(3), pages 103-103.
    17. Brian M. Doyle & Joseph E. Gagnon & Dale W. Henderson & Laurence H. Meyer, 2002. "International coordination of macroeconomic policies: still alive in the new millennium?," International Finance Discussion Papers 723, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    18. Rui Henrique Alves & Oscar Afonso, 2008. "Evaluating the reform of the stability and growth pact: new and better?," EKONOMIAZ. Revista vasca de Economía, Gobierno Vasco / Eusko Jaurlaritza / Basque Government, vol. 67(01), pages 392-409.
    19. Buiter, Willem H. & Sibert, Anne C., 2016. "Government deficits in large open economies: The problem of too little public debt," Economics - The Open-Access, Open-Assessment E-Journal (2007-2020), Kiel Institute for the World Economy, vol. 10, pages 1-39.
    20. Alastair Smith & David R. Hayes, 1996. "The shadow of the polls: Electoral effects on international agreements," International Interactions, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 23(1), pages 79-108, September.
    21. Loeper, Antoine, 2017. "Cross-border externalities and cooperation among representative democracies," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 91(C), pages 180-208.
    22. John William Hatfield & Gerard Padró i Miquel, 2008. "A Political Economy Theory of Partial Decentralization," NBER Working Papers 14628, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    23. Jon Faust, 1992. "Whom can we trust to run the Fed? Theoretical support for the founders' views," International Finance Discussion Papers 429, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    24. Yiyong Cai & Warwick McKibbin, 2015. "Uncertainty and International Climate Change Negotiations," Italian Economic Journal: A Continuation of Rivista Italiana degli Economisti and Giornale degli Economisti, Springer;Società Italiana degli Economisti (Italian Economic Association), vol. 1(1), pages 101-115, March.

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