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Policymakers' Horizon and the Sustainability of International Cooperation

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  • Paola Conconi
  • Nicolas Sahuguet

Abstract

This paper examines the impact of policymakers' horizon on the sustainability of international cooperation. We describe a prisoners' dilemma game between two infinitely-lived countries run by policymakers. We show that re-election incentives can act as a discipline device, making it easier to sustain cooperation between policymakers with finite but potentially renewable mandates than between infinitely-lived policymakers. We also show that, when voting suffers from a recency bias, policymakers may have incentives to "collude" to get re-elected and term limits may help international cooperation.

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Paper provided by ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles in its series ULB Institutional Repository with number 2013/98547.

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Date of creation: 2009
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Publication status: Published in: Journal of public economics (2009) v.93,p.549-558
Handle: RePEc:ulb:ulbeco:2013/98547
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  1. Yianis Sarafidis, 2007. "What Have you Done for me Lately? Release of Information and Strategic Manipulation of Memories," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 117(518), pages 307-326, 03.
  2. Paola Conconi & Carlo Perroni, 2009. "Do Credible Domestic Institutions Promote Credible International Agreements?," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/98549, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
  3. Paola Conconi & Nicolas Sahuguet & Maurizio Zanardi, 2014. "Democratic Peace And Electoral Accountability," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 12(4), pages 997-1028, 08.
  4. Gene M. Grossman & Elhanan Helpman, 2004. "A Protectionist Bias in Majoritarian Politics," NBER Working Papers 11014, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  5. Glaeser, Edward L, 1997. "Self-Imposed Term Limits," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 93(3-4), pages 389-94, December.
  6. Fair, Ray C, 1978. "The Effect of Economic Events on Votes for President," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 60(2), pages 159-73, May.
  7. William D. Nordhaus, 1975. "The Political Business Cycle," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 42(2), pages 169-190.
  8. Salant, David J., 1991. "A repeated game with finitely lived overlapping generations of players," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 3(2), pages 244-259, May.
  9. Eric W. Bond & Jee-Hyeong Park, 2002. "Gradualism in Trade Agreements with Asymmetric Countries," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 69(2), pages 379-406.
  10. Conconi, Paola & Sahuguet, Nicolas, 2005. "Re-election Incentives and the Sustainability of International Cooperation," CEPR Discussion Papers 5401, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  11. Eisenberg Daniel & Ketcham Jonathan, 2004. "Economic Voting in U.S. Presidential Elections: Who Blames Whom for What," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 4(1), pages 1-25, August.
  12. Giovanni Maggi, 1999. "The Role of Multilateral Institutions in International Trade Cooperation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(1), pages 190-214, March.
  13. Edward Glaeser, 1997. "Self-imposed term limits," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 93(3), pages 389-394, December.
  14. Smith, Lones, 1992. "Folk theorems in overlapping generations games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 4(3), pages 426-449, July.
  15. Putnam, Robert D., 1988. "Diplomacy and domestic politics: the logic of two-level games," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 42(03), pages 427-460, June.
  16. Michihiro Kandori, 1992. "Repeated Games Played by Overlapping Generations of Players," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 59(1), pages 81-92.
  17. Emanuel Ornelas, 2005. "Rent Destruction and the Political Viability of Free Trade Agreements," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 120(4), pages 1475-1506.
  18. John Ferejohn, 1986. "Incumbent performance and electoral control," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 50(1), pages 5-25, January.
  19. Gene M. Grossman & Elhanan Helpman, 2005. "A Protectionist Bias in Majoritarian Politics," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 120(4), pages 1239-1282.
  20. Lohmann, Susanne, 1993. "Electoral cycles and international policy cooperation," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 37(7), pages 1373-1391, October.
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Cited by:

  1. Conconi, Paola & Sahuguet, Nicolas & Zanardi, Maurizio, 2015. "Electoral Incentives, Term Limits and the Sustainability of Peace," CEPR Discussion Papers 10873, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  2. Paola Conconi & Nicolas Sahuguet & Maurizio Zanardi, 2009. "Democratic Peace and Electoral Accountability," NajEcon Working Paper Reviews 814577000000000388, www.najecon.org.
  3. Hubert Kempf & Stéphane Rossignol, 2010. "National Politics and International Agreements," Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne 10052, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne.
  4. J. Atsu Amegashie, 2009. "Incomplete Property Rights and Overinvestment," CESifo Working Paper Series 2711, CESifo Group Munich.
  5. Maggi, Giovanni, 2014. "International Trade Agreements," Handbook of International Economics, Elsevier.

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