National Politics and International Agreements
International agreements about transnational issues are difficult to reach, as the examples of the Copenhagen summit or the never-ending discussions of the future of the European Union make clear. In this paper, we relate this difficulty to the political process and the conflicts of interest attached to an agreement, both within and between national electorates, related to national income distributions. We set up a political economy model of a two-country world economy, where an international agreement on the financing of an international public good has to be negociated by two elected national delegates. We prove that any international agreement involves higher taxes in both countries than in the case of no-agreement. If reachable, an IA may generate losers in either country. If the political process involves a constraint on tax rates, an agreement may or may not be reached. Finally, when an agreement is reached, it may exhibit strategic delegation when the median voters are the Condorcet winners in both countries : this delegation is the outcome of the struggle by electorates to transfer the tax burden to the other country's taxpayers. In brief, the fate of an international agreements depends on national politics and distributive issues in the involved countries.
|Date of creation:||Jun 2010|
|Date of revision:|
|Note:||View the original document on HAL open archive server: http://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00497463|
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/|
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Bård Harstad, 2007. "Harmonization and Side Payments in Political Cooperation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 97(3), pages 871-889, June.
- Lange, Andreas & Vogt, Carsten & Ziegler, Andreas, 2006.
"On the Importance of Equity in International Climate Policy: An Empirical Analysis,"
ZEW Discussion Papers
06-42, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research.
- Lange, Andreas & Vogt, Carsten & Ziegler, Andreas, 2007. "On the importance of equity in international climate policy: An empirical analysis," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 29(3), pages 545-562, May.
- Hubert Kempf & Stéphane Rossignol, 2005.
"Is Inequality Harmful for the Environment in a Growing Economy?,"
2005.5, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
- Hubert Kempf & St�Phane Rossignol, 2007. "Is Inequality Harmful For The Environment In A Growing Economy?," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 19(1), pages 53-71, 03.
- Hubert Kempf & stéphane Rossignol, 2005. "Is inequality harmful for the environment in a growing economy ?," Cahiers de la Maison des Sciences Economiques v06045, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), revised May 2006.
- Hubert Kempf & Stéphane Rossignol, 2006. "Is inequality harmful for the environment in a growing economy ?," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-00117046, HAL.
- Lange, Andreas & Vogt, Carsten, 2003.
"Cooperation in international environmental negotiations due to a preference for equity,"
Journal of Public Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 87(9-10), pages 2049-2067, September.
- Lange, Andreas & Vogt, Carsten, 2001. "Cooperation in international environmental negotiations due to a preference for equity," ZEW Discussion Papers 01-14, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research.
- Paola Conconi & Nicolas Sahuguet, 2009.
"Policymakers' Horizon and the Sustainability of International Cooperation,"
ULB Institutional Repository
2013/98547, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
- Conconi, Paola & Sahuguet, Nicolas, 2009. "Policymakers' horizon and the sustainability of international cooperation," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 93(3-4), pages 549-558, April.
- repec:reg:rpubli:452 is not listed on IDEAS
- Grégoire ROTA-GRAZIOSI, 2006.
"On the strategic use of representative democracy in international agreements,"
- Grégoire Rota Graziosi, 2009. "On the Strategic Use of Representative Democracy in International Agreements," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 11(2), pages 281-296, 04.
- Grégoire Rota-Graziosi, 2011. "On the strategic use of representative democracy in international agreements," Working Papers halshs-00562632, HAL.
- Wallace E. Oates, 1999. "An Essay on Fiscal Federalism," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 37(3), pages 1120-1149, September.
- Alberto Alesina & Ignazio Angeloni & Federico Etro, 2005.
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 95(3), pages 602-615, June.
- Alesina, Alberto F & Angeloni, Ignazio & Etro, Federico, 2003. "International Unions," CEPR Discussion Papers 3913, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Alberto Alesina & Ignazio Angeloni & Federico Etro, 2003. "International Unions," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 2001, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
- Etro, Federico & Ageloni, Ignazio & Alesina, Alberto, 2005. "International Unions," Scholarly Articles 4553008, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Kyle Bagwell & Robert W. Staiger, 2004. "The Economics of the World Trading System," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262524341, June.
- Leo Wangler & Juan-Carlos Altamirano-Cabrera & Hans-Peter Weikard, 2013.
"The political economy of international environmental agreements: a survey,"
International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics,
Springer, vol. 13(3), pages 387-403, September.
- Leo Wangler & JJuan-Carlos Altamirano-Cabrera & Hans-Peter Weikard, 2011. "The Political Economy of International Environmental Agreements: A Survey," Jena Economic Research Papers 2011-038, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena, Max-Planck-Institute of Economics.
- Lasse Ringius & Asbjørn Torvanger & Arild Underdal, 2002. "Burden Sharing and Fairness Principles in International Climate Policy," International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 2(1), pages 1-22, March.
- Robert W. Staiger & Kyle Bagwell, 1999.
"An Economic Theory of GATT,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 89(1), pages 215-248, March.
- Bode, Sven, 2003. "Equal emissions per capita over time : a proposal to combine responsibility and equity of rights," HWWA Discussion Papers 253, Hamburg Institute of International Economics (HWWA).
- Besley, Timothy & Coate, Stephen, 2003. "Centralized versus decentralized provision of local public goods: a political economy approach," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(12), pages 2611-2637, December.
- Thomson, W., 1989.
"Cooperative Models Of Bargaining,"
RCER Working Papers
177, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER).
- Thomson, William, 1994. "Cooperative models of bargaining," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 35, pages 1237-1284 Elsevier.
- Koremenos, Barbara & Lipson, Charles & Snidal, Duncan, 2001. "The Rational Design of International Institutions," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 55(04), pages 761-799, September.
- repec:cup:cbooks:9780521576475 is not listed on IDEAS
- Wolfgang Buchholz & Alexander Haupt & Wolfgang Peters, 2005. "International Environmental Agreements and Strategic Voting," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 107(1), pages 175-195, 03.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hal:cesptp:halshs-00497463. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (CCSD)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.