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GOUVERNANCE ECONOMIQUE ET STABILISATION DES CHOCS ASYMETRIQUES: Quel mécanisme pour une meilleure viabilité de la CEMAC ?

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  • Patrick-Hervé Mbouombouo Mfossa

    (FSEG, CEREG - Université de Yaoudé II-Soa)

Abstract

This paper studies the adjustment to asymmetric shocks in the CEMAC. Based on the limits of the economic governance in this area, we suggest an off-market stabilization mechanism financed by a constant withdrawal on tax receipts of each country member of the union. In order to show the feasibility and usefulness of this mechanism, we carry out simulations over the period 1980-2008. Our results show that this mechanism is relatively operational and fair. However, its degree of coverage depends on the capacity of each country member to finance it, as well as the economic trend. A certain numbers of recommendations are deduced from these results.

Suggested Citation

  • Patrick-Hervé Mbouombouo Mfossa, 2015. "GOUVERNANCE ECONOMIQUE ET STABILISATION DES CHOCS ASYMETRIQUES: Quel mécanisme pour une meilleure viabilité de la CEMAC ?," Working Papers hal-01213989, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-01213989
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