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Faut-il une assurance communautaire contre des différences de conjoncture ?

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  • Jacques Mélitz

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[fre] Faut-il une assurance communautaire contre des différences de conjoncture ? . De nombreuses études ont cherché si le bon fonctionnement d'une union monétaire européenne ne nécessiterait pas de prévoir une assurance communautaire contre des disparités conjoncturelles trop fortes entre les États membres. Mais la mise en oeuvre d'un tel programme d'assurance devrait se faire sans effets redistributifs majeurs, des programmes particuliers étant, par ailleurs, mis en place à cet effet. . Une analyse statistique permet de conclure qu'un système d'assurance chômage communautaire ne concernerait, dans chacun des pays (y compris la France), qu'un nombre infime de chômeurs, et ceci dans des situations conjoncturelles extrêmes et très exceptionnelles. En revanche, une assurance communautaire au revenu par tête pourrait donner lieu à des transferts importants. Mais alors, la forte corrélation des conjonctures impliquerait des transferts qui ne seraient pas toujours opportuns. . Au total, le dilemme reste entre le choix d'un modèle simple et intuitif mais qui déborde largement sur une nouvelle redistribution systématique et prévisible, et un système plus sophistiqué mais qui présenterait soit un niveau d'assurance très faible, soit des transferts souvent non voulus. [eng] Should There Be a Community Insurance Against Economic Differences ? . Many studies have tried to establish whether the smooth running of European monetary union requires the provision of Community insurance against excessive disparities between Member States. Yet the implementation of such an insurance scheme would have to be made without any major redistributive effects. Specific schemes have been set up with this in mind. . Statistical analysis has shown that a well-adapted Community unemployment benefit system would concern only a minute number of unemployed in each of the countries (including France) and that it would only come into play in extreme and highly exceptional economic situations. On the other hand, Community insurance based on per capita income could give rise to considerable transfers. The problem with this is that the close correlation with business cycles would imply sometimes-inappropriate transfers. . When all is said and done, the dilemma remains between the choice of a simple and intuitive model that runs over into a new systematic and predictable redistribution and a more sophisticated system that would present either a very low level of insurance or often-unwanted transfers. [ger] 1st eine EG-Versicherung gegen konjunkturelle Disparitâten erforderlich ? . In zahlreichen Untersuchungen wurde die Frage erôrtert, . ob fur ein reibungsloses Funktionieren der Europàischen Wàhrungsunion nicht eine EG-Versicherung gegen zu starke konjunkturelle Unterschiede zwischen den einzelnen Mitgliedstaaten erforderlich sei. Die Schaffung einer solchen Versicherung durfte allerdings keine grôBeren Umverteilungseffekte bewirken, da es hierzu bereits spezielle Programme gibt. . Aus einer statistischen Analyse geht hervor, daB ein angemessenes EG-weites Arbeitslosenver- sicherungssystem selbst in extremen und auBergewohnlichen Konjunkturlagen in jedem Land (einschlieBlich Frankreichs) nur einer verschwindend kleinen Anzahl von Arbeitslosen nutzen wùrde. Dagegen kônnte eine g e m e i n s c h af tl ich e Pro- Kopf-Einkommensversicherung betràchtliche Transferzahlungen zur Folge haben. Aufgrund der starken Korrelation der Konjunkturen kâme es somit zu Transferzahlungen, die nicht immer zweckmâSig wâren. . Letztendlich besteht nur die Wahl zwischen einem einfachen und intuitiven Mod ell, das allerdings zu einer . neuen systematischen und vorhersehbaren Umverteilung fùhren wùrde, und einem weiterentwickelten System, das aber entweder einen sehr geringen Versicherungsschutz bote oder oftmals ungewollte Transferzahlungen zur Folge hàtte. [spa] Es necesario un seguro comunitario contra diferencias de coyuntura? . Numerosos estudios han intentado saber si el funcionamiento ôptimo de una union monetaria europea no necesitarîa prever un seguro comunitario contra disparidades coyunturales demasiado fuertes entre los Estados miembros. Pero la ejecuciôn de semejante programa de seguro no deberîa dar lugar a mayores consecuencias distributivas, si se aplicaran por otra parte unos programas especîficos que apuntarîan a este fin. . Un anâlisis estadîstico permite concluir que un sistema comunitario de seguro contra el paro bien adaptado solo afectarîa en cada paîs (Francia inclusive) a un numéro înfimo de parados, siendo ademâs extremas y muy . excepcionales las situaciones coyunturales. En cambio, un seguro comunitario de la renta per capita podrîa acarrear unas transferencias importantes. Pero entonces, la fuerte correlaciôn de las coyunturas implicarîa unas transferencias que no serîan siempre oportunas. . En suma permanece el dilema entre la elecciôn de un modelo sencillo e intuitivo pero que desembocarîa ampliamente en una nueva redistribuciôn sistemâtica y prévisible y la de un sistema mâs sofisticado pero que presentarîa o bien un nivel de seguro muy débil o bien unas transferencias no siempre deseadas.

Suggested Citation

  • Jacques Mélitz, 1993. "Faut-il une assurance communautaire contre des différences de conjoncture ?," Économie et Statistique, Programme National Persée, vol. 262(1), pages 101-108.
  • Handle: RePEc:prs:ecstat:estat_0336-1454_1993_num_262_1_5726
    DOI: 10.3406/estat.1993.5726
    Note: DOI:10.3406/estat.1993.5726
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Melitz, Jacques & Vori, Silvia, 1992. "National Insurance Against Unevenly Distributed Shocks in a European Monetary Union," CEPR Discussion Papers 697, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
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    1. Frédéric Zumer, 1998. "Stabilisation et redistribution budgétaires entre régions : État centralisé, État fédéral," Post-Print hal-03458360, HAL.
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    3. Patrick-Hervé Mbouombouo Mfossa, 2015. "GOUVERNANCE ECONOMIQUE ET STABILISATION DES CHOCS ASYMETRIQUES: Quel mécanisme pour une meilleure viabilité de la CEMAC ?," Working Papers hal-01213989, HAL.
    4. repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/766 is not listed on IDEAS
    5. Frédéric Zumer, 1998. "Stabilisation et redistribution budgétaires entre régions : État centralisé, État fédéral," Revue de l'OFCE, Programme National Persée, vol. 65(1), pages 243-289.

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