From Elections to Appointments of the Regional Governors: Major Challenges and Outcomes
In 2005 Russian Federation moved from the elections of the regional governor to their appointment by the federal center. The study analyzes the possible changes in the regional governments fiscal policy due to the change of the preferences aggregation mechanism at the regional level. It includes an overview of the existing theoretical and empirical studies, as well as international experience of the regional governments formation. The study also contains a theoretical and empirical analysis of the possible changes in the fiscal policy in Russia at the regional level as a result of the implemented reform.
|Date of creation:||2008|
|Date of revision:||2008|
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